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The smart grid is an electricity grid augmented with digital technologies that au-
tomate the management of electricity delivery. The smart grid is envisioned to be
a main enabler of sustainable, clean, efficient, reliable, and secure energy supply.
One of the milestones in the smart grid vision will be programs for customers to
participate in electricity markets through demand-side management and distributed
generation; electricity markets will (directly or indirectly) incentivize customers to
adapt their demand to supply conditions, which in turn will help to utilize intermit-
tent energy resources such as from solar and wind, and to reduce peak-demand.
Since wholesale electricity markets are not designed for individual participa-
tion, retail brokers could represent customer populations in the wholesale market,
and make profit while contributing to the electricity grid’s stability and reducing
customer costs. A retail broker will need to operate continually and make real-time
decisions in a complex, dynamic environment. Therefore, it will benefit from em-
ploying an autonomous broker agent. With this motivation in mind, this dissertation
viii
makes five main contributions to the areas of artificial intelligence, smart grids, and
electricity markets.
First, this dissertation formalizes the problem of autonomous trading by a
retail broker in modern electricity markets. Since the trading problem is intractable
to solve exactly, this formalization provides a guideline for approximate solutions.
Second, this dissertation introduces a general algorithm for autonomous
trading in modern electricity markets, named LATTE (Lookahead-policy for Au-
tonomous Time-constrained Trading of Electricity). LATTE is a general framework
that can be instantiated in different ways that tailor it to specific setups.
Third, this dissertation contributes fully implemented and operational au-
tonomous broker agents, each using a different instantiation of LATTE. These agents
were successful in international competitions and controlled experiments and can
serve as benchmarks for future research in this domain. Detailed descriptions of the
agents’ behaviors as well as their source code are included in this dissertation.
Fourth, this dissertation contributes extensive empirical analysis which val-
idates the effectiveness of LATTE in different competition levels under a variety
of environmental conditions, shedding light on the main reasons for its success by
examining the importance of its constituent components.
Fifth, this dissertation examines the impact of Time-Of-Use (TOU) tariffs in
competitive electricity markets through empirical analysis. Time-Of-Use tariffs are
proposed for demand-side management both in the literature and in the real-world.
The success of the different instantiations of LATTE demonstrates its gener-
ality in the context of electricity markets. Ultimately, this dissertation demonstrates
that an autonomous broker can act effectively in modern electricity markets by exe-
cuting an efficient lookahead policy that optimizes its predicted utility, and by doing
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To ensure sustainable existence for society, a transition to sustainable energy con-
sumption is necessary. In 2003, the U.S. Department of Energy published a report
named “Grid 2030: A National Vision For Electricity’s Second 100 Years” [114]
which lays out a vision and an action plan for upgrading the traditional electricity
grid into a smart grid. The smart grid is expected to be a major step towards sus-
tainable, clean, efficient, reliable, and secure energy supply. Current deployments of
smart grid technologies [108] and planned investments in the smart grid show that
there is high-interest around the world to make the smart grid vision a reality. In
the US, the required investments between 2011 and 2031 are estimated to total close
to 500 billion dollars, and the benefit is estimated to be 1.2-2 trillion dollars [17]. In
the European Union, the required investments between 2011 and 2050 are estimated
to total about 2 trillion Euros [18].
One of the milestones described in the Grid 2030 vision is “Programs for
customer participation in power markets through demand-side management and
distributed generation”. Demand-side management refers to adapting customers’
electricity demand to supply conditions, and may be implemented using new power
1
markets (aka electricity markets)1 that financially motivate desirable demand pat-
terns. Since wholesale power markets are not designed for individual customer
participation [49], retail brokers can represent large customer populations. These
retail brokers can aggregate and predict customers’ demand and production and
participate in the wholesale market on behalf of their customers. By representing
customer populations, brokers can make profit while reducing their customers’ costs
and contributing to grid stability [44, 47, 45]. Grid stability depends on having a
perfect balance between supply and demand at all times. Brokers who are financially
incentivized to maintain supply-demand balance in their portfolios can financially
incentivize their customers to adapt their demand to supply conditions, thus con-
tributing to demand-side management, and to the above Grid 2030 milestone.
A retail broker acts in multiple markets in parallel. In the retail market, it
designs tariff contracts that attract consumers and distributed producers (such as
rooftop solar and wind turbines). In the wholesale market, it bids for future energy
contracts. At all times the broker must maintain supply-demand balance in its
portfolio, potentially by affecting its customers’ demand through pricing incentives
and consumption curtailments.
Operating profitably as a retail broker is a challenging problem. A broker
needs to continually select among a large set of actions, under real-time constraints,
while incorporating large amounts of information and complex calculations into
its decision process, so that its long term profit is maximized in a competitive,
dynamic, and stochastic environment. Due to these problem characteristics, it can
be beneficial to employ an autonomous broker agent to decide and act on behalf of
the retail broker.
The idea of using autonomous electricity broker agents has been proposed by
Ketter et al. [44] and motivates the line of research in this dissertation. Russell and
1Throughout this dissertation we use the terms energy/electricity/power interchangeably.
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Norvig categorized agent task environments along a number of dimensions [93]. The
broker’s electricity trading task environment would be categorized using the most
complex option along each of these dimensions, being partially-observable, multi-
agent, competitive, stochastic, sequential, dynamic, continuous, initially-unknown.
On top of being continuous (having continuous world state and actions), this task
environment is also high-dimensional, having high-dimensional state and action rep-
resentations.
Due to the complexity of the broker’s electricity trading problem, a first
observation that can be made is that designing an autonomous broker that acts
optimally would be an impossible task. Thus, a primary research goal of this disser-
tation is designing and investigating autonomous electricity trading strategies that
approximate the optimal strategy and perform well empirically.
1.1 Objectives and Approach
1.1.1 Dissertation Research Question
The principal question addressed in this dissertation is:
How should an autonomous broker agent act to maximize its utility by trading
in time-constrained, modern electricity markets?
This dissertation advances towards answering this question by contributing a general
decision-making framework for an autonomous broker agent in smart grid environ-
ments where:
• A broker’s goal is maximizing its long term utility (profit).
• A broker decides on actions in real-time.
• A broker publishes tariff contracts to which retail customers can subscribe.
• A broker bids to buy and sell electricity in a day-ahead wholesale market.
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• Supply-demand imbalance incurs (positive or negative) payments on brokers.
1.1.2 Approach
Our general approach to answering the dissertation research question is to proceed
from theory to practice using a series of approximations: we start by formalizing
the complete electricity trading problem and characterizing its optimal solution; we
then use the problem formalization to guide us through a series of approximations
into practical solutions; we then create complete autonomous broker agents that
implement these practical solutions; finally, we test these brokers extensively in a
complex, realistic electricity trading environment, under a variety of conditions and
competition levels.
Electricity markets are going through a major transition from traditional,
regulated monopolies into deregulated, competitive markets [35]. While in principle,
deregulation can increase efficiency, in practice, the California energy crisis (2001)
has demonstrated the high-costs of failure due to flawed deregulation [99, 7], and the
importance of testing new market structures in simulation before deploying them.
This is the focus of the Power Trading Agent Competition (Power TAC) [44, 47, 45],
which we use throughout this dissertation as a substrate domain for our research.
Power TAC is a realistic, detailed platform for modeling and testing compet-
itive retail power market designs and related automation technologies. Power TAC
simulates a future smart grid environment with about 57,000 customers (about
50,000 consumers and 7,000 renewable producers), smart-metering, autonomous
agents acting on behalf of customers and retailers, and realistic market designs:
the wholesale market represents a traditional energy exchange, such as Nord Pool
or EEX, and the retail market is similar to ERCOT’s2. Power TAC’s customers
are simulated using state-of-the-art customer models [87]. In Power TAC’s envi-
2See www.nordpoolspot.gov, www.eex.com, www.ercot.com
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ronment, autonomous broker agents compete with each other to make profits by
trading in retail, wholesale, and balancing markets (the balancing market provides
a simplified version of the reserve and regulating capacity markets and associated
controls normally operated by an ISO/TSO organization [46]).
Research results from Power TAC may help policy makers create mechanisms
that produce the intended incentives for energy producers and consumers. They are
also expected to help to develop and validate intelligent automation technologies
that can support effective management of participants in electricity markets. Due
to the high-level of detail and realism of Power TAC, we believe it can be viewed as
a reasonable substrate domain for studying general electricity market conditions.
1.2 Contributions
This dissertation makes five distinct contributions at the intersection between arti-
ficial intelligence (AI), smart grids, and electricity markets:
Problem Formalization A formal specification of the problem of autonomous
trading by a retail broker in modern electricity markets. This formalization is
suitable when brokers trade in the retail market by publishing tariff contracts,
trade in the wholesale market by bidding for future contracts, and where
supply-demand imbalance results in (positive or negative) payments by the
broker. This problem is formalized as a Markov Decision Process, which due
to its complexity is intractable to solve exactly.
The LATTE Algorithm A general algorithm that approximates the solution to
the autonomous broker trading problem. LATTE stands for Lookahead-policy
for Autonomous Time-constrained Trading of Electricity. LATTE is a general
framework that can be instantiated in different ways that tailor it to specific
setups.
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Complete Agents using Instantiations of LATTE Fully implemented and op-
erational autonomous broker agents, each using a different instantiation of
LATTE. These agents were successful in competitions and controlled experi-
ments and can serve as benchmarks for future research in the power trading
domain. Detailed descriptions of the agents’ behaviors as well as their source
code are included in this dissertation.
Extensive Empirical Analysis Extensive empirical analysis validates the effec-
tiveness of LATTE, shedding light on the main reasons for its success by ex-
amining the importance of its constituent components.
Impact of Time-Of-Use Tariffs in Competitive Markets A gradient-ascent al-
gorithm for optimizing Time-Of-Use tariffs by an autonomous broker in com-
petitive markets (as a part of one of the instantiations of LATTE), and an
empirical analysis of the impact of Time-Of-Use tariffs in competitive mar-
kets, on an autonomous broker and on the market. Time-Of-Use tariffs are
a main method proposed for demand-side management both in the literature
and in real-markets.
From the perspective of AI, these contributions are a demonstration of effective se-
quential decision making in a complex partially-observable, multiagent, competitive,
stochastic, sequential, dynamic, continuous, high-dimensional, initially-unknown do-
main.
1.3 Dissertation Overview
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows.
Chapter 2 introduces the substrate domain used in this dissertation: The Power
Trading Agent Competition (Power TAC) simulation environment. Power TAC’s
6
simulation environment is a detailed, realistic electricity markets simulator
that is expected to help policy makers to create appropriate market mecha-
nisms, and to help to develop and validate intelligent automation technologies
for electricity markets.
Chapter 3 formalizes the problem faced by an autonomous electricity trading bro-
ker agent as a Markov Decision Process, which is impossible to solve exactly.
Therefore, this chapter provides guidelines for effectively approximating its
solution.
Chapter 4 introduces the LATTE algorithm, which is a general algorithm for au-
tonomous trading in modern electricity markets. LATTE stands for Lookahead-
policy for Autonomous Time-constrained Trading of Electricity.
Chapter 5 introduces the first instantiation of LATTE, used by the TacTex-13
agent, which won 1st place in the 2013 Power TAC finals. The chapter de-
tails TacTex-13’s constituent components and analyzes their contribution to
TacTex-13’s success.
Chapter 6 introduces a second instantiation of LATTE, used by the TacTex-15
agent, which achieved top performance in the Power TAC 2015 finals. The
chapter analyzes the performance of TacTex-15 in competitions and controlled
experiments, and the contributions of TacTex-15’s constituent components to
its performance.
Chapter 7 enables and enhances Power TAC customers’ demand-shifting capabil-
ities. This chapter then introduces a third instantiation of LATTE that uses
Time-Of-Use tariffs. It investigates how a broker should select such tariffs,
and what their impacts are on the broker and on the market.
Chapter 8 surveys related work in the electricity markets literature and in the
7
artificial intelligence and autonomous agents literature.
Chapter 9 summarizes the contributions of this dissertation, and outlines promis-
ing directions for future work.
For readers who may wish to read chapters out of order, Figure 1.1 presents
a diagram specifying the relations between the different chapters. For example,
a reader that may wish to read Chapter 7, will need to first read Chapter 2, then
Chapter 3, then Chapter 4 before reading Chapter 7. This reader will find Chapter 6
useful but not necessary to understand Chapter 7, and Chapter 5 useful but not
necessary to understand Chapter 6.
Figure 1.1: Guide for reading individual chapters: a solid arrow is drawn from
a chapter that is necessary as a background for a following chapter, and a dashed





This chapter describes the substrate domain used in this dissertation: the Power
Trading Agent Competition (Power TAC) simulation environment. The full details
of the Power TAC game are specified in the official game description [46]. This
chapter focuses on the aspects of the game that are most essential for understand-
ing the rest of the dissertation. In Power TAC, autonomous brokers compete with
each other to make profit by acting in multiple electricity markets in a simulated
smart grid environment. Section 2.1 overviews the competition and the simulation
environment. Section 2.2 details the actions available to brokers, the environment’s
response to these actions, and the environment sensors available to brokers. Sec-
tion 2.3 lists Power TAC’s modeling assumptions. The Power TAC simulation envi-
ronment is open-source, and can be downloaded from GitHub.1 A full specification
of the Power TAC game can be found in the Power TAC game description [46].
1https://github.com/powertac
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2.1 Power TAC Overview
This section overviews the Power TAC competition and simulation environment.
2.1.1 The Power TAC Competition
Power TAC is an annual competition in which the competitors are autonomous
brokers programmed by teams from around the world. The competition includes
hundreds of games and takes several days to complete. In a game, the Power TAC
simulator runs on a central server, while competing brokers run remotely and com-
municate with the server through the internet. Each broker receives partial state
information from the server, and responds by communicating the actions it takes.
The competition includes different game sizes, ranging from a small to large number
of competitors. After the competition, participants release their broker binaries,
which allows for running controlled experiments against the state of the art brokers.
2.1.2 The Power TAC Simulation Environment: An Overview
This section overviews the Power TAC simulation environment. Power TAC uses
a rich, detailed power markets simulator, modeling a smart grid environment of a
medium-sized city. Figure 2.1 shows the structure of the Power TAC simulation en-
vironment. Electricity is generated both by traditional generation companies which
generate on demand, and by distributed renewable producers, who are also retail
customers, which generate based on weather conditions. Electricity is consumed by
a variety of commercial and residential consumer customers. Power TAC has more
than 57,000 simulated customers (50,000 consumers and 7,000 renewable produc-
ers). Power TAC’s customers are autonomous agents that optimize the electricity-
costs and convenience of their human owners [87]. Customers represent commercial
and residential buildings, hospitals, distributed solar panels, wind farms, storage
facilities and electric vehicles. Consumers and producers consume/produce using
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time-series generators constructed from real-world data, according to weather and
calendar factors. Weather conditions are determined by files containing real-world
weather data, recorded in different geographical zones at different times of year.
Figure 2.1: Structure of the Power TAC simulation environment
In Power TAC, autonomous broker agents compete by acting in three mar-
kets: (1) a tariff market, which is a retail market where energy is traded with
consumers and distributed renewable energy producers, (2) a wholesale market, in
which generation companies sell energy and brokers procure energy (or sell sur-
plus), and (3) a balancing market, which ensures that electricity supply and demand
are balanced at all times and determines broker imbalance fees. The brokers com-
pete to maximize profit by gaining market share and trading electricity. A broker’s
game-score is its cash balance at the end of the game. A broker’s total score in a
competition is computed as a sum of its z-scores in each of the game-sizes, where a
z-score in a game size is computed based on brokers’ cumulative score in all games
of this size. The simulation proceeds in 1-hour timeslots for about 60 simulated
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days (about 60× 24 = 1440 timeslots). Each simulated timeslot takes 5 seconds of
real-time, and the whole simulation takes about 2 hours to complete. Therefore, in
each timeslot a broker has at most 5 seconds to complete its computation.
In the tariff market, brokers publish tariff contracts for energy consump-
tion/production. Tariffs may include fixed and varying prices and possibly bonuses
and/or fees. Once a tariff is published, customers can subscribe to it and con-
sume/produce energy under this tariff as long as it is active (i.e. not revoked),
paying or getting paid according to the tariff’s terms. Customers stochastically
subscribe to tariffs which maximize their utility, i.e. minimize their cost (or max-
imize their profit) and minimize their discomfort. A discomfort is created when
a customer needs to shift its consumption to save costs (see an exact formulation
in Section 7.1.2). Customers are equipped with smart-meters, so consumption and
production are reported to the broker every hour. Some customers represent whole
populations (e.g. a village of 30,000 people) and can subscribe subsets of their pop-
ulations to different tariffs. Brokers may publish one or more tariffs once every 6
hours, 4 times per day.
In the wholesale market, brokers directly interact with each other, as well as
with generation companies and other wholesale participants. The wholesale market
is a day-ahead market that operates as a periodic double auction (PDA). It repre-
sents a traditional energy exchange, such as Nord Pool, or EEX.2 At every hour,
24 independent double-auctions are executed in parallel, where each auction results
in power to be delivered in one of the following 24 hours (timeslots). In these auc-
tions, brokers, generation companies, and other simulated wholesale buyers place
bids specifying amount to buy/sell, limit-price, and delivery time. Therefore, bro-
kers have 24 opportunities to trade energy for each future timeslot, starting 24




Power TAC’s wholesale market is a relatively simple call market that is mod-
eled after existing wholesale power markets, with several simplifications. First,
the effects of transmission constraints on auctions are not modeled: Power TAC’s
wholesale market models a single region, with locational-marginal pricing modeled
through a simple manipulation of the wholesale supply curve [46]. Second, while
auctions for different timeslots are independent in Power TAC, in real markets they
are coupled through unit-commitment and other issues. Third, in North-American
and other real-world day ahead markets, the auctions do not have a rolling hourly
structure such as the one in Power TAC; instead, bids for the next day are submit-
ted once, on the previous day.3 On the other hand, Power TAC’s wholesale market
provides a realistic supply curve and auction clearing mechanism, which results in
a realistic financial impact on brokers. For example, the wholesale market incen-
tivizes brokers to reduce peak-demand and to contract with renewable producers.
Moreover, since Power TAC does not model “real-time” markets (as discussed later
in this section) the rolling structure of 24 sequential auctions provides an alternative
that allows brokers to control their imbalance in close to real-time.
On the electricity grid, electricity supply and demand must be balanced at
all times. The balancing market is responsible for real-time balancing of supply and
demand. The balancing market provides a financial incentive for brokers to balance
supply and demand in their portfolios in each timeslot, by being the most costly
to use for balancing purposes. In the real world, this function is typically han-
dled through ISO/TSO organizations and their ancillary services markets [9]. Since
Power TAC does not model the full grid hierarchy, the balancing market provides
3Several European markets have intra-day markets that allow for some of the repeated adjust-
ment of positions that can happen in Power TAC’s sequential auction mechanism. Still, these
repeated adjustments are different from those in Power TAC. For example, the Spanish market has
day-ahead bidding (i.e. 24 hourly, parallel auctions), and then three additional intra-day auctions;
however, these intra-day auctions do not extend past the end of the day, so there is no continuous
bidding process for the subsequent 24 hours such as the one in Power TAC.
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a simplified version of the reserve and regulating capacity markets and associated
controls normally operated by ISO/TSO [46].
Power TAC also models a Distribution Utility, which represents a regulated
electric utility that operates the distribution grid. The Distribution Utility has two
roles in Power TAC. First, it charges brokers a fixed distribution fee for the energy
transported over the grid by their customers. Second, it provides “default tariffs” to
which consumers and retail producers are subscribed in the beginning of a game. In
this role, the distribution utility simulates a monopoly that exists prior to market
liberalization. These default tariffs also bound brokers’ profits, since customers are
always free to choose them over brokers’ tariffs. These default tariffs are analogous
to the price-to-beat retail tariff that was required to be offered by incumbents in
the ERCOT retail market when it first opened.
The state of the game is rich and high-dimensional, containing 100s to 10000s
of variables (see Section 3.2.1): it includes the set of all active tariffs and customer
subscriptions, the current energy consumption/production of all customers,the whole-
sale market deliveries and orders of all brokers for the following 24 hours, the internal
states of all participants (brokers, customers, and generation companies), the cur-
rent weather and weather forecast, the current time, and the bank balance of all
brokers. The game state is partially observable to brokers. For instance, brokers
sees all published tariffs in the tariff market but they only know the customer sub-
scriptions for their own tariffs. Similarly, when an auction clears in the wholesale
market, brokers only see the clearing price of the auction and a list of uncleared
orders, but they do not know the list of cleared orders, or the future deliveries of
other brokers. The action space of brokers is also high-dimensional, containing 10s
to 100s of variables (see Section 3.2.1). For instance, tariff publications can include
up to 7× 24 = 168 hourly energy prices, and wholesale market actions can include
24 sets of orders, one set for each of the following 24 hours.
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2.2 Broker Interaction with the Environment
Autonomous agents operate by repeatedly sensing, deciding, and acting. This sec-
tion describes in detail how brokers sense the environment and what actions are
available to them. Later chapters of this dissertation focus on the broker’s decision
making process. Figure 2.2 provides a simplified overview of the sequence of interac-
tions of a broker with the simulation environment in each timeslot. The sequence of
simulation processes described in the figure is fixed, while brokers can send messages
at any time. Each simulation process uses all relevant broker messages that had ar-
rived before it needs them. Other messages are used in the following timeslot. The
following sections detail the available broker actions, the environment’s response to
these actions, and the broker’s sensing of the environment.
2.2.1 Broker Actions
This section describes the actions available to brokers, focusing on actions used by
brokers in this dissertation. In the tariff market, brokers can publish and revoke
tariffs. In the wholesale market, brokers can submit limit orders to procure and
sell energy for a future timeslot. In the balancing market, brokers can submit
balancing orders to curtail consumption of interruptible customers, and adjust the
consumption of storage customers for supply-demand balancing purposes. In our
experience the current simulator with the current parameters does not emphasize
balancing actions as being important strategically. Therefore the agents described
in this dissertation do not consider them to any meaningful extent.
Tariff Market Actions
Table 2.1 lists the tariff market actions used in this dissertation. In the tariff mar-
ket, brokers can publish one or more tariffs, revoke one or more tariffs, or take no
action. A tariff is a contract for buying or selling energy. A tariff can generally be
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Figure 2.2: Broker interactions with the simulation environment. Source:
the Power TAC game specification [46]. The diagram provides a simplified
overview of Power TAC the interactions between a broker and the environment
within one timeslot. Outgoing arrows represent possible actions, and incoming ar-
rows represent information sent by the environment to the broker. In the wholesale
market, a broker submits bids and asks for up to 24 parallel double auctions, and
then receives the results of these auctions in the form of order-books and cleared
orders. The weather service sends the current weather and forecast. In the tar-
iff market, a broker can publish tariffs, receive a notification on tariffs published
(by any broker), and receives updates on consumption/production of its customers
as well as subscriptions to its tariffs. Negotiation with large customers is not im-
plemented yet. In the balancing market, a broker can submit bids to balance its
portfolio (e.g. through curtailment), and it receives information about the balancing
actions executed and their costs. The accounting service sends the broker its whole-
sale market position, its cash position, and payment information for transactions
executed in any of the markets.
16
a consumption tariff which is offered to consumers, or a production tariff which is
offered to producers. Tariffs can also be more specific, e.g. a wind-production or
solar-production tariff. As long as a tariff is active (i.e. published and not revoked),
customers can subscribe to it, consume/produce energy and pay/get-paid according
to its terms (See more details below, in Section 2.2.2). There is no limit on the num-
ber of tariffs a broker can publish and revoke at any given time, however publishing
and revoking a tariff incurs non-negligible fees on the broker, which discourages the
broker from flooding the market with tariffs. The tariff publishing and revoking fees
are determined as game parameters.
Table 2.1: Tariff market actions used in this dissertation.
Action Description
publishTariff(T ) publish tariff T in the tariff market, making it
available for all customers to subscribe
revokeTariff(T ) revoke tariff T from the tariff market, making it
unavailable for customers to subscribe
no-op() Take no action.
Power TAC supports different types of tariffs, such as fixed-rate tariffs, Time-
Of-Use tariffs, real-time price tariffs, tiered rate tariffs, and interruptible-rate tariffs.
Each of these tariffs can be optionally augmented with signup, withdraw, and peri-
odic payments. In this dissertation we use two of the above tariffs, which we have
found to be most effective and most stably implemented and tested in the current
implementation of the simulator: fixed-rate tariffs and Time-Of-Use tariffs, defined
in Table 2.2. We do not use signup, withdraw or periodic payments.
Wholesale Market Actions
Table 2.3 lists the available wholesale market actions. In the wholesale market, a
broker can submit limit orders called bids and asks to buy and sell energy to be
delivered in one of the following 24 hours, or take no action. For each of the following
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Table 2.2: Tariffs used in this dissertation.
Action Description
Fixed-rate tariff A tariff T := 〈type, rate〉, where type ∈
{consumption, production, solar-production}
determines what type of customers can sub-
scribe to T , and rate specifies a fixed-price p ∈ R
per-kWh of energy, applicable at any time.
Time-Of-Use (TOU) tariff A tariff T := 〈type, rate1 , rate2 , ...〉, where type
is as for fixed-rate tariffs, and each of the (two
or more) rates rate1 , rate2 , ... specifies a fixed-
price p ∈ R per-kWh of energy that applies only
during specific day/times. A valid Time-Of-Use
tariff must cover each hour of the week with ex-
actly one rate.
24 hours, a separate double-auction is executed with all orders submitted for this
hour by brokers, generation companies, and other simulated wholesale buyers. The
double-auction determines the cleared orders (energy quantities and prices). There is
no limit on the number of orders a broker can submit for a future timeslot, other than
the physical limit determined by the communication channel’s bandwidth. However,
orders with quantities smaller than 10 kWh are ignored, to prevent brokers from
flooding the auction with infinitesimal orders. Submitting an order does not incur
any fee on the broker.
2.2.2 Environment Response to Broker Actions
This section describes in more detail the simulation environment’s (i.e. the endoge-
nous agents’) responses to brokers’ actions, in the tariff market and in the wholesale
markets.
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Table 2.3: Wholesale market actions.
Action Description
bid(〈e, l, t〉) A bid 〈e, l, t〉 := 〈energyAmount , limitPrice, targetTime〉
specifies an energy amount energyAmount ∈ R>0 to procure,
a limit-price limitPrice ∈ R∪{∞} that the broker is willing
to pay per-MWh of energy (∞ is known as a market-order,
which agrees for any price), and a target timeslot in one of
the following 24 hours targetTime ∈ {+1, ...,+24} in which
the energy is to be delivered. A convention of Power TAC
is to precede a bid with a negative sign to signify that the
bidder pays.
ask(〈e, l, t〉) An ask 〈e, l, t〉 := 〈energyAmount , limitPrice, targetTime〉
specifies an energy amount energyAmount ∈ R<0 to sell, a
limit-price limitPrice ∈ R∪{−∞} that the broker is willing
to get paid per-MWh of energy (typically positive, meaning
the broker is paid; −∞ is known as a market-order, which
agrees for any price, even if negative), and a target timeslot
in one of the following 24 hours targetTime ∈ {+1, ...,+24}
in which the energy is to be delivered.
no-op() Take no action.
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Tariff Market Response to Broker Actions
In the tariff market, customers respond to brokers’ tariff publications/revocations by
(a) potentially subscribing to a new tariff, and (b) consuming or producing energy
under the new tariff’s terms.
Subscribing to a Tariff. Customers are approximate utility-optimizers: their
subscription decisions are based on their predictions of their utilities under each can-
didate tariff. Specifically, tariff subscription is a two step process. First, customers
predict their utility under each candidate tariff in the tariff market. Their utility is a
weighted sum of monetary payments and discomfort factors. To predict their mon-
etary payments under a tariff, they predict their expected consumption/production
under this tariff, and compute the resulting payments based on the tariff terms.
Payments may include one-time fees/bonuses e.g. for early-withdraw or signup, re-
spectively. Discomfort factors take into account the need to shift consumption to
save costs under non-fixed-rate tariffs (See a detailed description in Section 7.1.2),
the need to switch brokers or tariffs, and the need to agree to consumption cur-
tailment: all these factors reduce the desirability of a tariff by customers. Second,
once customers compute the utility of each candidate tariff in the market, the use a
probabilistic softmax selection rule between tariffs, where a tariff with higher utility
is more likely to be selected. The softmax rule models imperfect tariff information
in the real-world.
In Power TAC, about 90% of the consumption and more than 90% of the
renewable production is done by customer models called factored-customers [87].
Some factored-customer models represent populations (e.g. a village of 30,000 peo-
ple) and can subscribe subsets of their population to different tariffs. Other customer
models represent an individual. In either case, each individual in the population is
always subscribed to exactly one tariff at any given time. Customers inertia which
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prevents customers from evaluating/switching tariffs too frequently.
Consuming/Producing Under a Tariff. Once customers are subscribed to a
tariff, they consume/produce under this tariff. Customers’ consumption/production
is determined by some or all the following factors: weather conditions, time-of-day,
day-of-week, elastic adaptation to tariff prices, random factors, shifted-consumption
under non-fixed-rate tariffs. These factors have different impact on different cus-
tomer types. For example, a residential customer will mainly consume in mornings,
evenings and weekends, a commercial customer will mainly consume during week-
days, and a solar producer will produce in sunny days.
Wholesale Market Response to Broker Actions
In the wholesale market, brokers’ orders enter into double auctions, and auction
results are sent back to brokers. At every hour, 24 independent double-auctions are
executed in parallel, where each auction results in power to be delivered in one of
the following 24 hours (timeslots). In these auctions, brokers, generation companies,
and other wholesale buyers place bids/asks specifying a quantity to buy/sell, a limit-
price, and delivery time. In the clearing process, demand and supply curves are
constructed from bids and asks, and their intersection determines the clearing price
and cleared quantity.
Figure 2.3 provides an example of a double auction. Note that bids specify
a positive energy quantity and a negative price, and asks specify a negative energy
quantity and a positive price. Note also that market orders (here specifying only
quantity) are ordered first, since they agree at any price. In this example, there is
no unique price where supply and demand curves intersect, therefore the average of
these prices is taken to be the clearing price. All bids higher than the last executed
bid and all asks lower than the last executed ask are fully executed for the same
clearing price. In this auction-example the clearing price is 16, and the total cleared
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quantity is 27 MWh. The last executed ask or bid may be only partially executed.
In our example, the last ask is partially executed.
Figure 2.3: Double-Auction Clearing Example. Source: the Power TAC
game specification [46]. See text for details.
After the auction completes, the following information is sent to brokers:
• The clearing price (16) and total quantity (27 MWh) are sent to all brokers.
• The uncleared orders are sent to all brokers, without broker information. In
this case these are the asks (-3, 15) and (-7, 16) and the bids (5, -14) and (7,
-12).
• Each broker’s cleared orders are privately sent to the broker.
• Updated cash and wholesale market positions (future energy deliveries for the
timeslot for which the auction was executed) are privately sent to each broker.
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• All orders that participated in the auction are discarded.
2.2.3 Broker Sensing
In Power TAC, a broker senses the environment through messages sent to it by the
simulation environment. These messages reveal to the broker partial information
about the simulation’s world state. This section lists the types of messages sent to
a broker by the simulator. We group messages by whether they are public (sent to
and known by all brokers) or private (sent to and known by a single broker), and
by the times in which they are sent. This section closely follows Section 3.3 from
the Power TAC 2015 game description [46].
Public Messages Sent by the Power TAC Simulator
The following messages are sent publicly to all brokers at the beginning of a game:
• Game Parameters: the parameters used to configure the current game. The
Power TAC game parameters are listed in Appendix B.
• Competing Broker Identities: the identities of competitor brokers, which
remain unchanged throughout a competition.
• Customers List: names and properties of customers in the current game,
most importantly their type (consumers, producers, solar-producers, inter-
ruptible consumers, etc.) and population-size.
• Default Tariffs: tariffs offered by the distribution utility, to which customers
are subscribed at the beginning of the game, and can re-subscribe at any point
in the game. Typically there are two such tariffs, one for producers and one
for consumers, at default prices that would be used in a monopoly situation.
• Bootstrap Customer Data: consumption and production of each customer
in the 14 days prior to the beginning of the game, under the default tariffs.
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• Bootstrap Wholesale Market Data: delivered prices and energy quantities
by generation companies to the customers of a default broker that represents
a monopoly in the 14 days prior to the beginning of the game.
• Bootstrap Weather Data: weather conditions in the 14 days prior to the
beginning of the game.
The following messages are sent publicly to all brokers once every 6 simulated hours:
• Tariff Updates: updates on newly published, revoked, or modified tariffs by
all brokers.
The following messages are sent publicly to all brokers once every simulated hour :
• Wholesale Market Clearing Data: wholesale market total quantities traded
and clearing prices for each of the 24 auctions executed in this timeslot.
• Wholesale Market Order Books: lists of uncleared bids and asks (each
includes a price and a quantity) from each of the 24 auctions executed in this
timeslot.
• Total Consumption and Production: the total consumption and the total
production by all simulated customers in the current timeslot.
• Weather Report and Forecast: weather conditions for the current timeslot
(temperature, cloud cover, wind direction, wind speed), and a 24-hour forecast
of these conditions.
Private Messages Sent by the Power TAC Simulator
The following messages are sent privately to each broker once every 6 simulated
hours:
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• Tariff and Subscription Changes Transactions: confirmations and paid
fees for the brokers’ tariff publication and revocations, subscription changes of
the brokers’ customers (either sign-up or withdraw) and associated payments
if exist, such as signup and early withdraw payments.
The following messages are sent privately to each broker once every simulated hour :
• Tariff Consumption/Production and Payment Transactions: consump-
tion and production of the brokers’ customers in the current timeslot and the
associated payments, broken down by customer-subscriptions (customer-tariff
pairs).
• Wholesale Market Transactions: cleared and partially cleared bids and
asks submitted by the broker.
• Wholesale Market Positions: energy to be delivered to/by the broker in
each of the following 24 timeslots.
• Distribution Transactions: the quantity distributed by the broker among
its customers and the associated charges for this distribution.
• Balancing Transactions: the broker’s supply-demand imbalance and the
associated charges for this imbalance.
• Cash Position: the broker’s current bank balance.
2.3 Power TAC Modeling Assumptions
This section lists the modeling assumptions used by the Power TAC simulation
environment [46], as follows.
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1. Line capacity limitations are ignored, reflecting an assumption that electricity
flows unconstrained over the simulated distribution grid, among all partici-
pants. This assumption frequently holds in distribution grids, so it is not a
major restriction. Once more distributed generators and storage facilities will
be simulated, this assumption will need to be re-examined.
2. Power factor effects, i.e. phase shifts between voltage and current, are ignored.
A lower power factor typically results in higher energy losses over the distri-
bution network. Therefore, electric utilities typically charge a higher cost to
industrial or commercial customers with a low power factor. Modeling power
factor effects in Power TAC may affect brokers’ decisions on how to charge
customers, but is currently out of scope.
3. Electricity distribution and transformation losses are ignored. These losses are
estimated to be 5.5% in North America [115], and can be considered roughly
constant and similar among distribution grid participants. Therefore, the
validity of the simulation results is not affected by this assumption.
4. In addition to traditional generation companies, two types of producers (elec-
tricity production facilities) are simulated. Producers of the first type produce
electricity whenever they are active. For example, solar arrays and wind tur-
bines are activated by weather conditions. Producers of the second type are
“controllable”: their output can be adjusted remotely within their capacity
range. Examples of this type are electric vehicle batteries, and some combined
heat and power units. Both of these producer types are becoming increasingly
common in the real world, and are therefore included in the simulation.
5. Real-time operations of the local distribution grid, including supply-demand
balancing, are outside the control of competing brokers, and are executed
using a combination of controllable generators and spinning reserves. In the
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real-world these operations are typically managed by a system operator.
6. Brokers pay for supply-demand balancing as determined by a balancing-market,
which constitutes a simplified version of real-world reserve and regulating ca-
pacity markets. Power TAC is not intended to model these markets in detail;
the balancing-market’s goal is mainly to incentivize brokers to balance supply
and demand as closely as possible.
7. Simulation time progresses in discrete timeslots, each representing one hour.
Timeslots correspond to trading intervals in a regional wholesale market. This
assumption allows for simulating a period of months rather than minutes
or hours. However, under this assumption, the temporal distribution of en-
ergy consumption and production cannot be captured. For example, supply-
demand imbalance is computed as the difference between total consumption
and production in a one-hour timeslot, rather than as an instantaneous differ-
ence between two continuous time-series.4
8. Some portions of consumption can be controlled directly (through curtailment)
or indirectly (using price signals). In the latter case, autonomous agents adjust
consumption on behalf of human consumers to optimize cost and comfort. This
assumption currently holds to some extent in the real-world, and is expected
to hold more widely in the future. For example, programs that allow for
consumption curtailment by utilities exist (e.g. in Austin, Texas), and some
autonomous agents are already being installed in buildings (such as smart-
thermostats).
4In the US and in some European markets, in addition to reserves and regulating markets there
are also “real-time” markets that allow for another set of auctions, at 5 or 15 minute intervals
(where offers are updated every hour and stay fixed for all 12 of the 5-minute auctions in any
given hour). The real-time market deals with some of the intra-hour supply demand balance, with
the result that less of the balance needs to be dealt with by the reserves and regulating capacity
markets. Such “real-time” markets are not modeled in Power TAC, and are assumed to be included
in the balancing-market model. However, the rolling structure of Power TAC’s 24 sequential double
auctions provides an alternative that allows brokers to control their imbalance in close to real-time.
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To summarize, the Power TAC simulator is fairly detailed and realistic, and
therefore we contend that it can be viewed as a reasonable substrate domain for
studying general electricity market conditions.
2.4 Chapter Summary
Future smart grids will require new power market structures [114]. Due to the risk
of deploying new market structures in the real-world [7], it is important to test new
market structures first in simulation. The Power TAC simulator is a detailed and
realistic retail markets simulator, and therefore we contend that it can be viewed
as a reasonable substrate domain for studying general electricity market conditions.
We use the Power TAC simulation environment as a substrate domain throughout
this dissertation.
In Power TAC, autonomous brokers compete with other for making profit
by gaining market share and trading energy with about 57,000 retail customers
(consumers and producers), by trading energy with generation companies and other
brokers in a wholesale market, and by participating in a real-time supply-demand
balancing-market. Such autonomous, self-interested, broker agents can be finan-
cially incentivized to contribute to social welfare, for example by maintaining supply-
demand balance in their portfolios, thus contributing to grid stability. We overviewed
the Power TAC simulator and detailed the parts that are used in the rest of this
dissertation. Full details can be found in the Power TAC Game Specification [46].
In the rest of this dissertation, on focus on the decision making process of an au-
tonomous broker agent in smart grid environments, as modeled by Power TAC.
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Chapter 3
The Broker’s Power Trading
Problem: Formalization
This chapter formalizes the complete broker’s power trading problem. Our formal-
ization is beneficial in multiple ways, as it: (1) compactly captures the complex
challenges faced by a broker, (2) characterizes the optimal solution, (3) provides
a guideline for approximating the solution and for extending existing approximate
solutions. Indeed, in the following chapters we use our problem formalization to
design a series of approximate solutions of increasing generality, which work effec-
tively in practice. While our formalization is based on the Power TAC simulator, we
expect it to generalize and be useful in reality, since Power TAC closely models real-
world markets. We start with an intuitive problem description (Section 3.1), then
formalize the power trading problem as a Markov Decision Process (Section 3.2),
and characterize approximate solutions (Section 3.3).
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3.1 The Power Trading Problem’s Temporal Structure
Figure 3.1 illustrates the temporal structure of a broker’s power trading problem.
In our illustration and in the rest of the dissertation we exclude balancing market
actions, since we have found in preliminary tests that the current simulator version
does not provide enough incentive to use them. Henceforth, we focus on tariff
and wholesale market actions. The temporal structure of the tariff and wholesale
market actions differ in multiple ways. Tariffs specify energy for immediate and
repeated delivery and are published at low-frequency (every one or more days).
Immediate delivery means that once a tariff is published, customers can subscribe
to it immediately and consume/produce energy under its payment terms. Repeated
delivery means that customers can do so indefinitely, until the tariff is either revoked
or expires. Tariff publications/revocations are typically executed at low frequency
(every one or more days) since (1) tariffs are for repeated delivery, (2) each tariff
publication/revocation incurs a fee paid by the broker, and (3) customers respond
slowly to tariff publications, due to inertia that binds them to their current tariff.
In contrast to the tariff market, wholesale actions (bids/asks, referred to here
as “orders”) typically specify energy for future, one-time delivery and are executed
at high-frequency (every hour). Future delivery means that the energy and payment
transactions specified in a cleared order happen in the future (one of the next 24
hours). One-time delivery means that these transactions happen once, in a single
timeslot. Since wholesale orders are for one-time delivery, and since the broker
trades energy continually, wholesale orders are executed at high-frequency.
3.2 Power Trading as a Markov Decision Process
Given the internal states of the simulator and competing brokers, the broker’s en-
ergy trading problem is a Markov Decision Process (MDP) [82]. However, since
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Figure 3.1: Temporal structure of the power trading problem. Time pro-
gresses to the right; the notation ‘+i’ stands for ‘i timeslots into the future’. Di-
amonds stand for broker actions. Squares stand for simulation environment re-
sponses. The top part represents the wholesale market: a broker submits limit
orders to buy/sell energy for the next 24 hours, then it receives the results of the 24
double-auctions. The bottom part represents the tariff market: a broker may pub-
lish one or more tariffs (once every 6 hours), and customers respond by potentially
(1) subscribing to new tariffs, (2) shifting consumption to cheaper times, and (3)
elastically adapting total consumption based on price.
competitors’ state and parts of the simulator state are unobservable, the trading
problem is actually a Partially Observable MDP (POMDP). Nevertheless, for com-
putational tractability and modeling clarity, we approximate the trading problem
as an MDP. We present our MDP definition next, denoting the acting broker as
B0. For easier reference, Table 3.1 summarizes the variables used for defining the
MDP’s main components, Table 3.2 summarizes the variables used in the MDP’s
state definition, and Table 3.3 summarizes the main variables used in the MDP’s
reward definition.
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Table 3.1: Variables used for the power trading MDP’s main components.
Variable Description
S the set of states
A the set of all actions
Aτ the set of tariff market actions
Aω the set of wholesale market actions
Aβ the set of balancing market actions
γ discount factor
st state at time t
at action(s) taken at time t
rt reward at time t
rτ tariff market component of the reward
rω wholesale market component of the reward
rβ balancing market component of the reward
• States: S is the set of states, where state s is a tuple
〈t,B, C,P, T ,SB0 ,QB0 ,AB0 , IB0 ,W, $B0 ,R〉
that includes the current time t (which encapsulates weekday/hour), and
the sets: competing broker identities B; identities of consumers C and pro-
ducers P (both referred to as customers); published tariffs of all brokers
T := ∪B∈BTB; customer subscriptions to B0’s tariffs SB0 ; current energy con-
sumption/production of B0’s customers QB0 ; recent auction results AB0 :=
{〈pc, qc,OcB0 ,Ou,MB0〉j}t+24j=t+1 including, for each of the following 24 times-
lots, the clearing price pc and total quantity qc, B0’s cleared orders OcB0 , all
brokers’ uncleared orders Ou, and B0’s wholesale market-positions MB0 (en-
ergy deliveries and charges, updated incrementally from OcB0); B0’s energy
imbalance IB0 ; current weather and forecast W; B0’s cash balance $B0 ; and
randomly sampled game-parameters (such as fees and game length) R.
Note: the underlying state of the game, which includes elements unobserved
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Table 3.2: Variables used in the power trading MDP’s state definition. We
use the following conventions: calligraphic letters (e.g. B) stand for sets; uppercase
letters stand for items in sets (e.g. B is an item in B); lowercase letters are items or
numbers that are not part of a set; a superscript symbolically augments a variable’s
letter (to avoid two-letter variables, for instance, pc is an auction’s clearing price,
where the superscript clarifies the type of the price); a subscript defines either a
subset (when it indexes a calligraphic letter), or an item in a set (when it indexes an
uppercase letter). One exception is our use of $ to stand for a set of cash balances,
and of $B to stand for one item in the set, due to the symbolic meaning of the sign
$.
Note: these conventions could lead to conflicts with other notation in this disser-
tation (e.g. MDP states and a subscription share the letter S). Due to the large
number of variables it is hard to avoid some conflicts, so in case that happens, we
make sure to explicitly disambiguate and clarify the use of a variable. We preferred
the option of keeping notation intuitive at the expense of some notation overload,
rather than using unique, but non-intuitive letters for variables.
Variable Description
t current time (which encapsulates weekday/hour)
B the set of competing brokers’ identities
Bo the set of competing brokers, including their internal states
B a broker identity
B0 the identity of the broker acting in the MDP
Go the set of generation companies, including their internal states
C the set of consumers’ identities
Co the set of consumers, including their internal states
P the set of producers’ identities
Po the set of producers, including their internal states
T tariffs published by all brokers
TB tariffs published by broker B
S customer subscriptions
SB customer subscriptions to broker B’s tariffs
Q current energy consumption/production of all brokers
QB current energy consumption/production of broker B’s customers
A recent auction results for all brokers
AB recent auction results for broker B
pc auction clearing price
qc auction’s total traded quantity
OcB auction’s cleared orders of broker B
Ou auction’s uncleared orders of all brokers
MB wholesale market-position of broker B
I energy imbalances of all brokers
IB energy imbalance of broker B
W current weather and forecast
$ cash balance of all brokers
$B cash balance of broker B
R randomly sampled game-parameters (such as fees and game length)
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Table 3.3: Variables used in the power trading MDP’s reward definition.
Variable Description
Qconst energy quantity consumed by the broker’s customers at time t
pconst average price of energy sold to the broker’s customers
Qprodt energy quantity produced by the broker’s customers at time t
pprodt average price of energy procured from the broker’s customers
Qaskt energy quantity sold by the broker in the wholesale market at time t
paskt average price of energy sold by the broker in the wholesale market
Qbidt energy quantity procured by the broker in the wholesale market at time t
pbidt average price of energy procured by the broker in the wholesale market
by the broker, is the tuple
〈t,Bo,Go, Co,Po, T ,S,Q,A, I,W, $,R〉
where Bo,Go, Co,Po are the sets of brokers, generation companies, consumers
and producers, respectively (the difference from B,G, C,P is that while these
sets included only object identities, the sets Bo,Go, Co,Po include complete
objects, and importantly the internal states of these objects)1; and where
S := ∪B∈BSB, Q := ∪B∈BQB, A := ∪B∈BAB, I := {IB}B∈B, $ := {$B}B∈B.
• Actions: A broker’s set of actions A := Aτ ∪ Aω ∪ Aβ is composed of tariff
market actions Aτ , wholesale market actions Aω and balancing market actions
Aβ, as follows.
1. Tariff market actions Aτ : publish/modify/revoke tariffs. A tariff is a
tuple T = 〈type, rates, fees〉 where:
– type ∈ {consumption, production,...} can be general (e.g. production)
1An internal state generally refers to the computation state of an object. Different objects may
have different representations of their internal state. For example, two competing brokers may be
implemented differently, and therefore their computation states may have different representations.
Most generally, an object’s internal state is a snapshot of its representation in the computer’s
memory. The distinction between an object identity and a complete object that includes an internal
state is important for understanding our MDP: while the latter is part of the complete MDP’s state,
only the former is observed by the broker acting in the MDP.
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or specific (e.g. solar-production).
– rates: a set of rates, each specifying price/kWh and times, and/or
usage thresholds where it applies.
– fees: optional periodic/signup/withdraw payments.
2. Wholesale market actions Aω: submit limit orders of the form
〈energyAmount , limitPrice, targetTime〉
to buy/sell energy for one of the next 24 hours.
3. Balancing market actions Aβ: submit customers energy curtailment re-
quests (currently unused).
• Transition Function: The transition function is partially deterministic and
partially stochastic, as follows. The time t is incremented by 1 hour; B, C,P
remain unchanged; T is updated by publish/modify/revoke tariff actions, de-
terministically by B0, and stochastically (due to unobservability) by other bro-
kers; SB0 is updated stochastically based on customers’ decisions; QB0 is deter-
mined stochastically based on weather and customers’ internal states (shifting
and elasticity, see Figure 3.1); AB0 is updated with auction results, stochasti-
cally since (i) competitors rely on stochastic information (demand predictions),
(ii) competitors’ internal states are hidden, and (iii) generation companies
bid stochastically; IB0 is a deterministic function of TB0 ,SB0 ,QB0 ,AB0 ; W is
stochastic; $ is updated deterministically from the recent stochastic reward;
and R remains unchanged.
• Reward: Let st, rt, at be the state, reward, and broker-action(s) at time t.
Let rτ , rω, rβ be the broker’s energy buy/sell payments in the tariff, wholesale,
and balancing markets respectively. Let dist be the energy distribution fees,
and fees the tariff-market fees. The reward at time t can be characterized by
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the following function.
rt(st−1, at−1, st) := r
τ (st)+r
ω(st)+r

















t )× distFee︸ ︷︷ ︸
dist(st)
−pub(at−1)− rev(at−1)± psw(SB0,t−1,SB0,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
fees(st−1,at−1,st)
(3.1)
where ± denotes components that can be positive of negative; Qconst , Q
prod
t are
the total consumed/produced quantities by B0’s customers in the tariff-market
(both are sums of entries ofQB0); Qaskt , Qbidt are the amounts B0 sold/procured





t are the average buying/selling prices (determined by TB0 , SB0 ,





Qbidt (which depends on unobserved other broker imbalances I \IB0,t); distFee
is a fixed fee per kWh transferred over the grid; pub, rev are tariff publication
and revoke fees; psw are tariff periodic/signup/withdraw fees/bonuses.
• Discount Factor: γ reflects daily interest on cash balance.
3.2.1 Dimensionality of the State and Action Spaces
To get a better understanding of the size of the trading problem, we estimate the
number of dimensions (i.e. variables) in the MDP’s state and action spaces. Fre-
quently, complex MDPs use factored state representations, in which a state is repre-
sented as a fixed set of variables, each taking values from some discrete or continuous
domain. However, in the power trading problem’s MDP, a state cannot be repre-
sented as a fixed set of variables since it contains information of unbounded, variable
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size (bounded only by the computer memory’s size). Example of such variable-size
information is the set of existing tariffs and the set of uncleared wholesale orders. In
practice, the sizes of these sets are within some reasonable ranges, based on which
we provide a rough estimation of the typical number of dimensions in a state, as
follows.
• Time (t): 1 variable.
• Identities of brokers, consumers and producers (B, C, P): typically 10s
of variables.
• Published tariffs (T ): typically 10s to 100s of tariffs, each containing 1-168
prices, 0-4 fee parameters, so that the number of variables is roughly 10s to
10000s.
• Broker subscriptions (SB0): between 0 and the number of customers. The
number of customers is currently about 57,000, but in the current implementa-
tion customers are grouped into up to several 100s of groups (each member of
a group consumes/produces identically), therefore the number of subscriptions
is between 0 and 100s.
• Current energy consumption/production of customers (QB0): be-
tween 0 and the number of customers which is, as was just described, up
to 57,000 but currently typically 100s of groups.
• Auction results (AB0): 24 sets, each containing 0 to 10s of cleared and
uncleared orders, and one market-position. Each order has 2 variables, so the
total number of variables is around 100s.
• Broker imbalance (IB0): 1 variable.
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• Weather and forecast (W): 25 sets, each with 4 variables, describing the
current weather conditions and the conditions in the following 24 hours. There-
fore, the number of variables is 100.
• Cash balance ($B0): 1 variable.
• Game parameters (R): 24 variables (See Appendix B)
Based on these estimations, the number of state variables ranges between
100s to 10000s of variables. The action space is high-dimensional as well. A tariff
action contains 1-168 prices and 4 fee parameters, and a broker can publish any
number of tariffs at a given time. Historically, brokers have typically published a
single tariff at a time, so the number of tariff-action dimensions is practically 1-
172. A wholesale bid has two variables, and a broker can submit any number of
bids. Historically, brokers have typically published 0-10s of bids at each time, so the
number of variables of wholesale actions is around 10s.
3.3 Lookahead Policies as Approximate Solutions
The MDP’s solution is an optimal power-trading policy (a mapping from states to
actions). There are two problems that prevent solving the MDP exactly: first, the
high-dimensional states and actions and the complex reward makes it computation-
ally intractable, and second, some components of the transition and reward functions
are unknown to the broker. Therefore, brokers necessarily can only approximate the
solution.
Powell et al ([79]) identify four basic classes of approximate solutions to large
MDPs: policy function approximation, cost function approximation, value function
approximation, and lookahead policies. The effectiveness of each of these classes
varies based on specific problem properties. Furthermore, in practice it might not
be possible to test all of these policy classes for every problem, since some classes
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might not be applicable to some problems. Therefore [79] proposes general guidelines
for when to use each class, based on their experience:
• Policy function approximations are applicable when there is a clear relationship
between state and action, or when the policy function can be approximated
accurately.
• Cost function approximations are applicable when a deterministic model pro-
vides a good solution, where some adjustments are needed to make the solution
more robust.
• Value function approximations are applicable when the value of being in a
state is easy to approximate.
• Lookahead policies are needed in time-varying (i.e. non-stationary) settings,
and when the value of being in a state is hard to approximate.
Based on these guidelines lookahead policies seem suitable for our domain, which is
non-stationary due to factors like weather and other brokers’ policies, and where it is
unclear how to approximate a value function accurately due to the high-dimensional
state and action spaces and the complex reward function.
Lookahead policies are a class of partial solutions for MDPs and POMDPs
(Partially Observable MDPs) that can be effective in high-dimensional state-spaces [6,
39, 22, 20, 64, 97, 109]. Lookahead policies come in different variations, and include
brute-force tree-search policies, Monte-Carlo tree search policies, roll-out heuristics,
deterministic rolling-horizon procedures (also known as receding horizon procedures,
and model-predictive control), and stochastic rolling-horizon procedures [80].
Lookahead policies make a decision in a given state by solving an approxima-
tion of the problem over some horizon. Instead of computing the optimal policy over
the entire state-space, they approximate it by optimizing over simulated hypotheti-
cal lookahead trajectories st, rt, at, st+1, rt+1, at+1,... using generative models that
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predict action effects (next state and reward). In the trading problem’s MDP, the re-
ward is a deterministic function of st−1, at−1, st except for the bal(IB0,t) component.
Therefore a broker needs generative models for bal(IB0,t), for T \ TB0 ,SB0 ,QB0 (to






t ), and for AB0 (to predict Qaskt , paskt , Qbidt , pbidt ).
While lookahead policies reduce the complexity of finding approximate MDP
solutions in high-dimensional state-spaces, they can still be intractable in presence
of high-dimensional action-spaces, if they blindly search over (subsets of) high-
dimensional actions at every lookahead step. In our domain, while action effects can













t for: consumption tariffs, production tariffs, wholesale sell, whole-
sale buy, respectively), (i) there is an innumerable set of possible (subsets of) high-
dimensional actions of each type, and (ii) different action-types cannot be optimized
independently: the bal(IB0,t) function is designed such that imbalance fees typically
result in negative reward when taking actions of a single type, while positive reward
can be achieved by taking actions of multiple types in parallel (to maintain low
imbalance). Therefore, any tractable lookahead policy is required to efficiently (i)
sample, and (ii) combine the actions to simulate.
3.4 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we formalized the broker’s power trading problem as an MDP. Due
to the high-dimensional state and action spaces, it is computationally intractable
to solve this MDP exactly. Of the different classes of approximate MDP solutions,
lookahead policies seem appropriate for the power trading domain. In the next
chapter, we describe one of the main contributions of this dissertation: the LATTE
algorithm, which defines a general lookahead policy that approximates the MDP’s
solution. Later chapters (specifically Chapters 5, 6, and 7) will instantiate this







In the previous chapter, we asserted that lookahead policies have the potential to
perform effectively in the power trading domain, and we pointed out two challenges
that a tractable lookahead policy must address: efficiently (i) sampling, and (ii) com-
bining the actions to simulate in a lookahead trajectory. This chapter introduces
a general lookahead policy that approximates the power trading MDP’s solution,
and which is used throughout this dissertation by all our agents: the LATTE algo-
rithm (Lookahead-policy for Autonomous Time-constrained Trading of Electricity).
LATTE addresses (i) and (ii) by utilizing functional dependencies in the broker’s
action effects, and by utilizing the temporal structure of the power trading problem
(Figure 3.1). In that sense, LATTE is specific to the power trading problem. On
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the other hand, LATTE serves as a general template for power trading lookahead
policies, by leaving parts of its definition open for different implementations. In that
sense, LATTE is a general, flexible framework that can be instantiated in different
ways to address specific setups. We describe the principles used in LATTE’s design
(Section 4.1), followed by a detailed description of LATTE (Section 4.2).
4.1 The Design Principles of LATTE
Lookahead policies (also called Monte Carlo search policies) maximize the expected
sum of future one-step rewards over simulated trajectories. In the power trading
problem, the one-step reward is defined by Equation 3.1. In this dissertation we
avoid using periodic/signup/withdraw fees, since we believe their current imple-
mentation in the Power TAC simulator has some issues that need to be fixed, and
therefore we ignore the psw() component of the reward, which corresponds to these













t , as seen in Equation 3.1. LATTE utilizes
connections between these variables to address challenges (i) and (ii) and implement
an efficient lookahead policy.
We address challenge (i) (of sampling actions efficiently) differently in each
market. In the tariff market, LATTE samples the tariff action space in a reasonable
region around the best existing tariffs, considering only a single tariff publication
at a time rather than subsets of actions. The sampling resolution is determined
by a real-time constraint on computation and the time it takes to predict a single
action effect. Here an action effect consists of updates of state variables T ,SB0 ,QB0
(tariff subscriptions and consumption/production under each tariff), which in turn




t , and p
prod
t over the simulated horizon.
To address (i) in the wholesale market, LATTE uses a hierarchical two-step








is a return (sum of rewards) of a 24-step bidding policy π(Q) for buying (selling)
quantity Q for a minimal (maximal) price. First, LATTE assumes in its lookahead
that π is fixed and treats Q as an “action” (the decision to be made). LATTE uses
an “action”-effect predictor Qbidt
π7→ pbidt (or Qaskt
π7→ paskt ) that can be queried with
sampled energy quantities and predict their average prices in the wholesale market.





pbidt . Second, LATTE separates the subproblem of approximating a cost-optimizing
sequential bidding policy π(Q) for trading quantities Q. In our instantiations of
LATTE, this subproblem is solved using a small MDP isolated from the full MDP.
To address challenge (ii) (efficiently combining actions) we start by observing
that there is a functional relationship between energy quantity Q∗t and price p
∗
t of
each action type ∗ ∈ {cons, prod, ask, bid}: p∗t is typically an increasing/decreasing
function of Q∗t when buying/selling energy respectively. Therefore, we can focus






t . In the
tariff market, a broker has direct control only over prices (through tariff publication
actions), and the traded quantities are determined indirectly as a function of the
broker’s tariffs. In the wholesale market, a broker controls both quantity and price
in its bids, so it is convenient to think of the broker as first fixing a desired quantity
to trade and then optimizing the price for which it is traded.
The reason why actions need to be optimized in conjunction is the imbalance






t − Qbidt , which
typically dominates trading costs in the tariff and wholesale markets. In general, a
broker can benefit from imbalance (when it helps to counter-balance other brokers’
imbalanced portfolios). Given a balancing predictor which predicts bal(IB0,t) for
different imbalance values IB0,t, a lookahead policy can sample different imbalance
levels and predict their cost/benefit for the broker.1
1In our implementations we always aimed to constrain the imbalance to 0 both for computational
efficiency and since any imbalance does not seem beneficial in the current simulator.
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To achieve a desired imbalance level, a broker needs to adjust the difference
between the quantities it procures and sells. To do that efficiently, we take advan-
tage of the temporal structure of the trading problem (Figure 3.1). Since tariffs
result in repeated energy delivery and are published at low frequency, a single pub-
lication can (stochastically) determine Qconst , Q
prod
t throughout the horizon. Since
wholesale actions are for one-time delivery, and happen at high frequency, they
can adapt the traded amounts more flexibly than tariff publications, separately for
each timeslot. These properties gives rise to the following efficient combination of







t throughout the lookahead horizon. Second, use these pre-
dicted quantities and the desired imbalance level to determine the (net) amount
needed in the wholesale market in each future timeslot Qbidt −Qaskt . Third, sample
combinations of Qbidt , Q
ask




















the predicted utility (sum of rewards over the horizon) of this combination of actions.
LATTE uses this procedure to combine actions in its efficient lookahead pol-
icy, which repeatedly samples candidate tariffs and combines them with wholesale
actions as described, predicts the expected utility of each combination, and exe-
cutes the combination that maximizes the predicted utility. We note that such a
lookahead policy can be viewed as a best-response strategy which does not take into
account game-theoretic considerations: it assumes that the set of existing tariffs
in the market remains fixed throughout the horizon, and does not try to predict
opponents’ responses to publishing a new tariff. Due to the complexity of opponent
modeling in our domain, we leave it as an avenue for future work. We compensate
for the lack of opponent modeling by frequently replanning, i.e. by executing LATTE
frequently.
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4.2 The LATTE Algorithm
This section presents the details of the LATTE algorithm. Figure 4.1 provides a
visual overview of LATTE. A summary of the approach is as follows. When the
broker agent receives the most recent observations from the environment, it exe-
cutes LATTE. LATTE is a lookahead policy that generates and evaluates candidate
action combinations (box 1), and executes the combination that is predicted to max-
imize utility in the tariff and wholesale markets (box 2). To generate a combination
of actions, LATTE generates a candidate tariff action, which can be tariff publica-
tion, revocation or no-op (box 1.1); next, it predicts its effect on subscriptions and
demand/production (box 1.2); next, it generates corresponding wholesale energy
quantities to trade (box 1.4); next, it predicts the payments for trading these whole-
sale quantities (box 1.5); next, it combines these predictions to predict a utility
over the future horizon (box 1.6). This computation flow can be augmented with
an optional internal loop of generating and evaluating combinations with different
imbalance levels (see box 1.3), which affect the quantities traded in the wholesale
market. This step is currently unused in our implementation (See Section 4.1), but
may become important in future versions of the simulator.
Note how action generation is interleaved with action-effect predictions: boxes
1.1 and 1.4 are action generation stages, while boxes 1.2 and 1.5 are action-effect
prediction stages. Interleaving actions in this way allows for utilizing the temporal
structure of the problem and constraining the search space, by taking into account
the predicted tariff market quantities (and optionally the desired imbalance) when
generating wholesale actions.
In box (1), the broker agent treats wholesale actions as quantities to trade
(step (i) in the hierarchical approach described in Section 4.1). In box (2), wholesale
quantities are converted into bids using a wholesale bidding policy π (step (ii) in
the hierarchical approach).
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Figure 4.1: The LATTE algorithm. Thin (red) arrows indicate the computation
flow. Rounded boxes indicates computation stages, which may be nested. Wide
arrows indicate data read/write (yellow) and communication with the environment
(light blue).
Algorithm 1 presents the pseudo-code of LATTE. Numbered comments corre-
spond to computation states in Figure 4.1. Abstract functions that must be instan-
tiated in specific implementations of LATTE are underlined. In particular, different
implementations of these functions are specified in Chapters 5, 6, and 7 of this
dissertation. LATTE has two phases. In phase 1 (lines 2-24) it generates action
combinations and predicts their utilities. In phase 2 (lines 25-31) it executes the
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best combination of actions in the tariff and wholesale markets.
In phase 1, if there is still time and phase 1 has not finished (line 3), LATTE
generates and evaluates a combination of actions. First, a candidate tariff ac-
tion is generated (line 5). This action is one of: publishing a new consumption
or production tariff, revoking an existing tariff, and a no-op. Next, the tariff
action effect is predicted, specifically the changes in tariff subscriptions and con-
sumption/production under the new subscriptions. These predictions are used
for predicting the total quantities and prices traded by the broker with its cus-






t and the quantities traded by the broker’s competi-
tors Q⊕const , Q
⊕prod
t (line 7).
2 Next, there is an optional step of trying to benefit
from imbalance, by sampling imbalance quantities (line 9), and aiming for the sam-
pled imbalances (lines 11, 13). A default implementation of this step uses only zero
imbalance. Lines 10-20 generate wholesale actions and predict their effect through-
out the simulated horizon. Lines 13-20 describe a degenerate implementation which
does not separate wholesale buying and selling quantities in its optimization, but
rather uses just one of them at a time.3. Tariff market predictions and the desired
imbalance determine the amount to trade in the wholesale market (line 13). Using
the quantities it needs to trade in the wholesale market and the quantities predicted
to be traded by competitors in the wholesale market (line 14), LATTE predicts the
price of the traded amounts in the wholesale market (line 16). The reason it uses the
amount traded by competitors is that wholesale prices are typically a function of the
total amount traded by all brokers. Lines 17-20 assign values to one pair of variables
based on whether the traded quantity is procured or sold. Next, LATTE combines
all predictions into a utility prediction for the current combination of actions and
2We are using the symbol ⊕ throughout to indicate the competitors’ values of a variable.
3In the current simulator wholesale selling opportunities are much less frequent than wholesale
buying opportunities: wholesale selling typically happens when customers leave a broker for com-
petitors and the broker needs to sell any excess it had procured. Optimizing both wholesale buying
and selling quantities might become important in future versions of the simulator, and could be
addressed as we described in Section 4.1
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Algorithm 1 The LATTE Algorithm
. The main algorithm executed by TacTex. Abstract functions are denoted as FunctionName.
1: function LATTE
2: . (1) Sample combinations of actions in tariff/wholesale markets and predict their expected utility
3: while not Done() do
4: . (1.1) Generate candidate tariff
5: aτ ← ComputeNextCandidateTariffAction()
6: . (1.2) Predict quantities/prices based on subscriptions and consumption/production








t 〉|t = +1, . . . ,+H} ← PredictTariffEffects(aτ )
8: . (1.3) Sample candidate imbalance levels
9: for I ∈ SampleImbalanceLevels() do
10: for t ∈ {+1, . . . ,+H} do
11: IB0,t ← I
12: . (1.4) Compute needed energy. (Qwholesalet is net wholesale quantity Q
bid
t −Qaskt ).
13: Qwholesalet ← Qconst −Q
prod










15: . (1.5) predict costs of procuring needed energy
16: pwholesalet ← PredictWholesalePrice(Qwholesalet , Q
⊕wholesale
t , t)
. Degenerate implementation: either buy or sell in the wholesale market, but not both
17: if Qwholesalet > 0 then
18: Qaskt ← 0, paskt ← 0, Qbidt ← Qwholesalet , pbidt ← pwholesalet
19: else
20: Qbidt ← 0, pbidt ← 0, Qaskt ← Qwholesalet , paskt ← pwholesalet
. Record current action combination
21: aω ← 〈Qbid+1 , Qask+1 , Qbid+2 , Qask+2 , . . . , Qbid+H , Q
ask
+H〉
22: a← aτ ∪ aω



















t , bal(IB0,t), a
τ )
25: . (2) Execute the combination of actions in tariff/wholesale markets that maximizes predicted utility
26: a∗ ← arg maxa utilities[a]
27: ExecuteActionInTariffMarket(a∗τ ) . tariff market actions
28: 〈Qbid+1 , Qask+1 , Qbid+2 , Qask+2 , . . . , Qbid+H , Q
ask
+H〉 ← a
∗ω . wholesale market actions
29: for t in +1,+2,... do
30: WholesaleBiddingPolicy(Qbidt , t)
31: WholesaleBiddingPolicy(Qaskt , t)
. Function implementations common to all instantiations:
. Reward function from Equation 3.1














t , bal(IB0,t), a
τ )








t −Qbidt pbidt +
bal(IB0,t)− dist(Qconst , Q
prod
t )− pub(aτ )− rev(aτ )
34: return rt
. Default implementation assuming competitors will be balanced (buy exactly what they need)
35: function PredictCompetitorWholesaleQuantity(Q⊕const , Q
⊕prod
t )







records the mapping from actions to utility (lines 21-24).
In phase 2, LATTE selects the action combination that maximizes the pre-
dicted utility (line 26), executes the tariff action in the tariff market (line 27)4, and
trades the desired amounts in the wholesale market (lines 28-31) using a wholesale
bidding policy that aims to minimize their costs.5
There are two function implementations that are common to all our instantia-
tions of LATTE: the Reward() function and the PredictCompetitorWholesaleQuantity()
function. The Reward() function sums the predicted reward components into a
complete one-step reward (lines 32-34). The PredictCompetitorWholesaleQuantity()
predicts that competitors will trade in the wholesale market the quantity that will
result in zero imbalance in their portfolio (lines 35-37). This assumption does not
necessarily hold, and therefore more sophisticated implementations of this function
could be explored in future work.
4.3 Chapter Summary
In this chapter we introduced LATTE, which implements an approximate solution to
the energy trading MDP in the form of an efficient lookahead policy. Based on Pow-
ell’s characterization of lookahead policies [80], LATTE can be classified as a rolling-
horizon, Monte-Carlo search policy. We have described the principles used in the
design of LATTE as well as the algorithm itself, both graphically and in pseudo-code.
LATTE contains abstract methods that can be implemented in different ways in dif-
4In practice, while LATTE is invoked at every timeslot, our implementation allows it to publish
tariffs only once every 6 hours in the first four days (which is the minimal publication interval
in Power TAC), and thereafter only once every 24 hours. This implementation is equivalent to
running LATTE with an implementation of ComputeNextCandidateTariffAction that returns a no-op
in every timeslot in which tariff publications are not allowed. The reason we artificially limit tariff
publications is that our subscription predictors ignore customers’ inertia and this may lead to over
publishing in some cases.
5Since the wholesale market is a day-ahead market, WholesaleBiddingPolicy can only be called
for the next 24 timeslots, even if the horizon H is longer than 24 timeslots. However, since LATTE
runs at every timeslot, eventually it bids for every timeslot in the horizon.
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ferent setups. The following chapters will describe specific instantiations of LATTE
that were used effectively in practice. Specifically, these implementations consis-





Adaptive Power Trading Agent
This chapter introduces TacTex-13, the champion broker agent from the inaugu-
ral Power TAC competition in 2013. TacTex-13 is a complete, fully implemented
broker agent that instantiates the LATTE algorithm with components that learn
online to predict the tariff and wholesale market action effects, and to bid in the
wholesale market. This chapter describes the constituent components of TacTex-13’s
instantiation of LATTE (Section 5.1), and examines TacTex-13’s success through
analysis of competition results and subsequent controlled experiments (Section 5.2).
TacTex-13’s binary is publicly available, along with source code of more recent ver-
sions, which can be configured through a text file with TacTex-13’s components (see
Appendix A).
0This chapter is based on a published conference paper [111] that I wrote with Professor Peter
Stone. Author contributions were as follows: I was a Ph.D. student and did the complete imple-
mentation, and Peter was my advisor and collaborated with me on deciding on research directions
and analyzing and interpreting results.
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5.1 TacTex-13 Description
TacTex-13 uses a restricted instantiation of LATTE that procures power in the whole-
sale market, sells power in the tariff market, and aims for zero imbalance. To sell
power in the tariff market, TacTex-13 uses only fixed-rate consumption tariffs and
does not use tariff-revoke actions. This instantiation restricts and simplifies LATTE
in multiple ways, and results in several reward components being zero throughout
the LATTE algorithm, as follows (see the complete reward specification in Algo-
rithm 1, lines 32-34):
• Since TacTex-13 does not use production tariffs, Qprodt = 0 and p
prod
t = 0.
• Since TacTex-13 aims for zero imbalance, IB0,t = 0 and bal(IB0,t) = 0.
• Since Qprodt = 0 and IB0,t = 0, we get that Qbidt = Qwholesalet = Qconst , and
that Qaskt = 0 and p
ask
t = 0 (based on lines 13, 17, 18 of Algorithm 1).
• Since TacTex-13 never uses tariff-revoke actions, rev(aτ ) is always 0.
Next, we describe how TacTex-13 instantiates the abstract functions defined in
LATTE’s phase 1 (Section 5.1.1) and phase 2 (Section 5.1.2).
5.1.1 TacTex-13’s Instantiation of LATTE’s Phase 1
Instantiating ComputeNextCandidateTariffAction()
TacTex-13 instantiates the ComputeNextCandidateTariffAction() function as follows.
The first call to this function generates a set of candidate fixed-rate tariffs and
returns the first candidate; each subsequent call returns the next candidate in the
set. The set of candidate tariffs is generated as 100 fixed-rate tariffs with prices that
are equally spaced in a range that contains the currently best published tariff prices.
More specifically, let rng := [p1, p2] be the price range that lies between the rate
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of the best tariff published by TacTex-13 and the (average) rate of the best tariff
published by its competitors; then the candidate tariffs are generated in the range
[0.8p1, 1.2p2].
The numbers 0.8 and 1.2 were initially chosen heuristically, to allow for price
reduction or increase of up to 20%. Later, informal experimentation showed that
perturbing these values did not generally improve performance. Specifically we ob-
served that: (i) perturbing the upper bound of 1.2 by 0.1 did not significantly affect
performance; (ii) perturbing the lower bound of 0.8 by 0.1 affected performance only
when playing against a small number of cooperative competitors (which do not re-
duce prices aggressively): using a value of 0.9 or 0.95 instead of 0.8 resulted in milder
price reductions, and therefore in higher scores (profits) for all brokers, but reduced
the broker’s market share and thus increased the risk of losing the game; (iii) per-
turbing the lower bound of 0.8 to 0.7 did not significantly improve performance; and
(iv) perturbing the lower bound to 0.3 significantly reduced performance in games
where initial wholesale cost predictions under-estimated the actual wholesale costs,
since the broker reduced prices more than it should have, and its profit decreased
significantly.
This instantiation of ComputeNextCandidateTariffAction() has several benefits
for the broker. First, it simplifies the optimization: LATTE searches solely over one
type of tariff action, namely fixed-rate tariff publications, and therefore optimizes
only one selling-price rather than a separate price for each future timeslot. Moreover,
fixed-rate tariffs reduce stochasticity in action effects, since they do not encourage
customers to shift consumption, thus making customers’ behavior more predictable.
Second, customers in Power TAC prefer tariffs that do not cause any discomfort
(i.e. consumption shifts), so using fixed-rate tariffs makes it easier for TacTex-13 to
acquire customers.1
1Clearly, shifting consumption to follow energy supply is one of the primary goals of future smart
grids. Tariffs that encourage that are aligned with this goal. Chapter 7 investigates the usage of
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Instantiating PredictTariffEffects(aτ)
TacTex-13’s instantiation of PredictTariffEffects is presented in Algorithm 2. This
instantiation predicts only the Qconst and p
cons
t variables, since the other predicted
variables from line 7 of LATTE (Algorithm 1) are unused by TacTex-13. The length
of the horizon H over which these variables are predicted is one week (7× 24 = 168
timeslots). We chose this length as a trade-off between shorter horizons, which
might not capture weekly consumption/production patterns, and longer horizons
which present higher uncertainty and require more computation.
At the core of Algorithm 2 lies the problem of estimating the demand re-
sulting from a tariff publication. We decompose this problem into two problems:
(1) predicting the resulting customer migration between tariffs (line 4), and (2) pre-
dicting the demand of each of the customers over the lookahead horizon (line 5).
The former is detailed below in Algorithm 3. The latter is addressed by maintain-
ing records with average past demand for each customer, in each of the 168 weekly
timeslots, and using these records to predict future demand. This implementation
ignores weather conditions and uses only the time of week to predict consumption.
It also ignores demand elasticity and does not consider customers’ adjustment of
demand based on the tariff they are subscribed to. While these simplifications may
fail to capture complex patterns in the data, they help the broker to learn online to
predict demand with little data. This tradeoff between the complexity of predictive
models and the amount of data needed for learning them is generally a key tradeoff
in machine learning (known as the bias-variance tradeoff ), and specifically a key
tradeoff in learning to predict customer demand. The small amounts of data avail-
able for online learning in Power TAC were the reason we used simplified predictive
models with strong generalization.
Using the information gathered in lines 4-5, the total demand and income are
such tariffs by self-interested brokers.
54
computed by summing over all customer-tariff pairs (line 6-11). Lines 12-14 convert
the total demand and income into the Qconst and p
cons
t variables which are returned
as the predicted action effects of the tariff publication aτ .
Algorithm 2 TacTex-13::PredictTariffEffects(aτ )
. Initializing variables
1: tariff ← aτ . Renaming for readability
2: totalDemand [1,...,168] ← [0,...,0]
3: totalIncome[1,...,168] ← [0,...,0]
. Predicting effects
4: subscriptions[·,·] ← PredictChangeInSubscriptions(tariff )
5: demandProfiles[·] ← PredictCustomerDemandProfiles()
6: for cust ∈ customerModels do
7: for tariff ∈ {tariff ∪ existingTariffs} do
8: n ← subscriptions[cust ,tariff ]
9: customerDemand [1 . . . 168] ← n × demandProfiles[cust]
10: totalDemand [1 . . . 168] ← totalDemand [1 . . . 168] + customerDemand [1 . . . 168]
11: totalIncome[1 . . . 168] ← totalIncome[1 . . . 168] + customerDemand [1 . . . 168] · tariff .rate()
12: for t ∈ {1, 2, ..., 168} do




return {〈Qconst , pconst , 0, 0, 0, 0〉|t = +1, . . . ,+168}
Algorithm 3 describes the function PredictChangeInSubscriptions(), which is
used in line 4 of Algorithm 2. PredictChangeInSubscriptions() predicts the changes
in subscriptions as a result of a new tariff publication. It starts with predicting all
customer demand profiles (line 1), similarly to line 5 of Algorithm 2.2 TacTex-13
predicts the change in subscriptions separately for each customer (line 2). Recall
that Power TAC customers represent whole populations and can subscribe subsets
of their population to different tariffs. For each tariff, the predicted weekly de-
mand of a single member of the population (line 3) is multiplied by this tariff’s
rate to compute the expected weekly charge for a single member under this tariff
(line 6, implemented similarly to the right term in line 11 of Algorithm 2); then
it is paired with the number of individuals currently subscribed to this tariff to
form a pair 〈charge,numSubs〉 that is added to a set of such pairs (line 8). The
pairs 〈charge, numSubs〉 are used as a training set for a supervised learning al-
2In practice, instead of repeating this function call in each of the algorithms, we cache results
and use them.
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gorithm, specifically Locally Weighted Linear Regression (LWR), that predicts the
subscribed-population size for the candidate tariff based on its expected charge (lines
9-12). LWR (see, e.g. [3]) was chosen since, being non-parametric, it requires very
few assumptions about the representation of the predicted function (the customer
preference function).3
Since new subscribers to the candidate tariff must migrate from other tariffs
(published by either TacTex-13 or its competitors), TacTex-13 uses a normalization
step after which all tariff subscriptions are scaled proportionally so that the to-
tal number of predicted subscriptions equals the customer’s population size (line
13). Typically, part of the population is subscribed to competitors. In line 10,
charge2subs must represent the entire customer population (e.g. to be able to predict
migration of customers from competitors to TacTex-13), even though subscriptions
to competitors are unobservable by TacTex-13. To represent the complete popula-
tion, a dummy subscription is added to charge2subs, which assigns the portion of
the population that is not subscribed to TacTex-13’s tariffs to the best competitor
tariff. Finally, all the predicted subscriptions for this customer are added to a map
(lines 14-15) that is returned by the algorithm.
Instantiating SampleImbalanceLevels()
TacTex-13 always aims for zero imbalance and therefore uses a degenerate instanti-
ation of SampleImbalanceLevels() that returns the set {0}.
Instantiating PredictWholesalePrice(Qwholesalet , Q
⊕wholesale
t , t)
TacTex-13 predicts energy costs similarly to how it predicts customer demand pro-
files: it maintains a record of past average costs in each of the 168 weekly times-
3This implementation ignores customer inertia, i.e. the tendency to stay with the current tariff.
Therefore, it predicts the eventual subscriptions if no further action is taken in the market by any
broker.
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Algorithm 3 TacTex-13::PredictChangeInSubscriptions(candidateTariff )
1: demandProfiles[·] ← PredictCustomerDemandProfiles()
2: for cust ∈ customers do
3: customerDemand [1 . . . 168] ← demandProfiles[cust ]
4: charge2subs ← {}
5: for tariff ∈ existingTariffs do
6: charge ← ExpectedTariffCharge(customerDemand , tariff )
7: numSubs ← currentSubscriptions[cust , tariff ]
8: charge2subs ← charge2subs ∪ 〈charge,numSubs〉
9: charge ← ExpectedTariffCharge(customerDemand , candidateTariff )
10: trainingSet ← charge2subs
11: numSubs ← PredictWithLWR(trainingSet , charge)
12: charge2subs ← charge2subs ∪ 〈charge,numSubs〉
13: charge2subs ← Normalize(charge2subs)
14: for tariff ∈ candidateTariff ∪ existingTariffs do
15: predSubs[cust ,tariff ] ← ExtractSubscriptions(charge2subs,tariff )
return predSubs
lots and use it to predict future costs based on the time of week t. Doing so as-
sumes that energy cost is independent of the quantity predicted to be procured by
TacTex-13 (Qwholesalet ) or its competitors (Q
⊕wholesale
t ), and that energy costs in a
given weekday/time-of-day combination are similar between different weeks. These
assumptions hold when customer weekly consumption patterns are similar between
different weeks (which can happen when weather is similar and when brokers use
only fixed rate tariffs which discourage consumption shifting), and when the energy
quantity procured in the wholesale market by all brokers is roughly equal to the
quantity consumed by all customers in every timeslot. These assumptions roughly
held in the Power TAC 2013 finals, where brokers mostly used fixed-rate tariffs, and
procured most of their energy in the wholesale market.
5.1.2 TacTex-13’s Instantiation of LATTE’s Phase 2
In phase 2, LATTE decides on the quantities to trade in the wholesale market
for future target timeslots t. These quantities (Qbidt or Q
ask
t ) are denoted here
as Qt. TacTex-13 sends these quantities to a wholesale bidding policy that is
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encapsulated in the abstract function WholesaleBiddingPolicy(Qt, t). This section
describesTacTex-13’s instantiation of WholesaleBiddingPolicy(Qt, t).
In the wholesale market TacTex-13 primarily procures energy (to satisfy the
demand of its customers), and only sells energy when it predicts that future demand
would be smaller than the quantity it had already procured (e.g. as a result of
customers migrating to competitors). Since TacTex-13 mostly procures energy in
the wholesale market, its wholesale bidding policy is designed to minimize the cost
of procuring a quantity Qt. When TacTex-13 needs to sell energy in the wholesale
market, it uses a default randomized policy that reduces its selling-price offers as
time gets closer to the target timeslot t.
To minimize the energy costs TacTex-13 needs to (1) minimize the rates for
which it procures energy in the wholesale market, and (2) minimize its imbalance
costs, by satisfying the future demand as accurately as possible. To do the latter, it
must (2.1) have accurate predictions of future demand (provided by LATTE), and
(2.2) be able to procure all the energy predicted to be demanded. For notational
convenience, we will denote here a target timeslot as ttar and a general timeslot as t.
The actions that affect the energy cost for a target timeslot ttar are the 24 bidding
(or not-bidding) actions in each of the 24 preceding timeslots, (ttar−24, ..., ttar−1),
which thus comprise a sequential bidding process with 24 steps. Thus, at each
timeslot t, TacTex-13 executes, respectively, steps 1, 2, . . . , 24 of 24 independent
bidding processes for timeslots t+ 24, . . . , t+ 1.
TacTex-13’s wholesale market bidding policy uses a modified version of Tesauro’s
bidding algorithm [105]. We model the sequential bidding process as a Markov De-
cision Process (MDP) [82] in a specific way that allows for computational efficiency,
and more importantly in the competitive environment that TacTex-13 operates in,
it allows for high reuse of data, and thus quick online learning with little data.
The bidding MDP is isolated from the complete power trading MDP, by using a
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subset of state variables and actions of the complete MDP to define the bidding
MDP. TacTex-13’s bidding MDP is defined next, followed by the rationale behind
its design:
• States: s ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 24, success}, s0 := 24
• Actions: limit-price ∈ R
• Transition: a state s ∈ {1, . . . , 24} transitions to one of two states. If a
bid is partially or fully cleared, it transitions to the terminal state success.
Otherwise, a state s transitions to state s − 1. The clearing (i.e. transition)
probability ρcleared(s, limit-price) is initially unknown.
• Reward: In state s = 0, the reward is the balancing-price per energy unit.
In states s ∈ {1, . . . , 24}, the reward is 0. In state success, the reward is the
limit-price of the successful bid. Both balancing-price and limit-price are taken as
negative, so maximizing the reward results in minimizing costs. balancing-price
is initially unknown.
• Terminal States: {0, success}
In a sequential bidding process for a target timeslot, the broker actions are
bids of the form bid(energy-amount,limit-price). Tesauro’s bidding MDP uses these
actions as the MDP actions. However, we excluded energy-amount from the decision
making; it is always set to the difference between predicted demand Qttar and the
energy that is already procured for the target timeslot (TacTex-13’s market-position,
represented in the complete MDP’s state variable MB0,ttar).
The solution to our MDP is a sequential bidding policy that minimizes the
expected energy unit-cost for the next fraction of the procured quantity. Note
that there is a transition to a terminal state success even in cases where the bid is
partially cleared. One implication of excluding energy-amount from the MDP’s state
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and action representations is that every sequential bidding process executes over the
same sequence of states, thus allowing for computational and data efficiency, as seen
next.
Since the MDP is acyclic (linear), solving it requires one back-sweep, starting
from state 0 back to state 24, applying the following backup operator to compute a
value function:
V (s) =
balancing-price if s = 0minlimit-price{ρcleared × limit-price + (1− ρcleared)× V (s− 1)} if 1 ≤ s ≤ 24
The MDP’s solution determines an optimal (over this MDP which approximates the
real MDP) limit-price for each of the 24 states. Using our MDP model, TacTex-13 is
always in states 1, . . . , 24 of 24 concurrent bidding processes. Therefore, TacTex-13
solves the MDP once per timeslot, and submits the 24 optimal limit-prices to the 24
auctions.
Before solving this MDP, TacTex-13 needs to learn the MDP’s unknown quan-
tities, namely the expected balancing-price at s = 0 and the transition function
ρcleared. TacTex-13 learns the transition function from past data by recording, for
each state s ∈ {1, . . . , 24}, the wholesale trades executed in s into a set Ps (here P
stands for density). Each trade has the form (clearing-price,cleared-energy-amount)
(pc and qc from the complete MDP’s auction results AB0). The set Ps is treated
as a non-parametric density estimation and a transition probability is estimated





To estimate the mean balancing-price, TacTex-13 similarly maintains a set P0 of past
balancing data. Since every bidding MDP executes over the same sequence of states
s ∈ {0, . . . , 24}, every trade executed in state s can be used by all future bidding pro-
cesses as a part of Ps. Thus, our state representation allows TacTex-13 to efficiently
reuse data and thus speed-up learning. Clearly, our state representation relies on
the assumption that time-to-target-timeslot is a dominant feature in determining
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the transition function, i.e. the distribution of auction closing prices. Were that not
the case, other features would need to be added to the MDP’s state.
TacTex-13’s bidding policy is summarized in Algorithm 4 which is TacTex-13’s
main routine in the wholesale market, executed at every timeslot. It computes the
needed energy for the coming 24 timeslots using demand-predictions and market-
positions (line 1), then adds the previous timeslot’s wholesale market trades and
balancing information to the Ps sets (line 2). If not enough trades were recorded
for each state (specifically fewer than 6), a randomized bidding policy is executed,
otherwise the MDP-based bidding policy is executed (lines 3-7). The number 6 was
chosen to trade off quick learning with reasonable density estimations.
Algorithm 4 Online RL Wholesale Market Strategy
1: neededEnergy [1 . . . 24] = ComputeNeededEnergy()
2: densities[0 . . . 24] ← AddRecentTradesAndBalancing()
3: if HasEnoughData(densities) then
4: limitPrices[1 . . . 24] = SolveMDP(densities)
5: else
6: limitPrices[1 . . . 24] = RandomizedBiddingPolicy()
7: SubmitBids(neededEnergy [1 . . . 24], limitprices[1 . . . 24])
To summarize, TacTex-13 starts a game with no data and learns to bid online,
while acting. Its estimates are refined during the game as it collects more data. At
each timeslot, it solves the MDP with all the data collected so far. The result is
an online reinforcement learning (RL) bidding algorithm that allows TacTex-13 to
adapt and optimize its bidding policy to each game’s specific market conditions.
5.2 Results
This section examines the success of TacTex-13 through analysis of the competition
and controlled experiments.
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5.2.1 Competition Results: Power TAC 2013 Finals Analysis
The Power TAC 2013 finals were held in conjunction with the AAAI’13 conference.
The qualifying competitors were 7 brokers developed by research groups from Europe
and the USA. The competition included all possible combinations of 2-broker and
4-broker games (21 and 35 games respectively), and 4 7-broker games. Table 5.1
shows the final cumulative scores in each of the game sizes, the final z-scores in each
of the game sizes, and competition totals. The final ranking is determined by the
rightmost column, which sums the z-scores of all game sizes. TacTex-13 had both
the highest total z-scores and the highest cumulative scores. In the 2-broker games
TacTex-13 won all of its 6 games. In the 4-broker games, TacTex-13 won 15 out of
the 16 games it completed successfully (TacTex-13 got disconnected from 4 games
due to technical issues with the infrastructure we used). TacTex-13 did not win the
7-broker games despite having the largest volume of customers. Next, we analyze
these results.
Table 5.1: Results of the Power TAC 2013 finals
Cumulative Scores Z-Scores
Broker 7-broker 4-broker 2-broker Total 7-broker 4-broker 2-broker Total
TacTex-13 -705248 13493825 17853189 30641766 0.386 0.449 0.691 1.526
cwiBroker 647400 12197772 13476434 26321606 0.437 0.442 0.536 1.415
MLLBroker 8533 3305131 9482400 12796064 0.413 0.391 0.395 1.199
CrocodileAgent -361939 1592764 7105236 8336061 0.399 0.381 0.311 1.091
AstonTAC 345300 5977354 5484780 11807435 0.425 0.406 0.254 1.086
Mertacor -621040 1279380 4919087 5577427 0.389 0.380 0.234 1.003
INAOEBroker02 -76112159 -497131383 -70255037 -643498580 -2.449 -2.449 -2.421 -7.319
Figure 5.1 shows averages of the main components of the brokers’ cash flow,
for each of the game sizes.4 Brokers are ordered based on their final ranking in
the competition, from left to right. For each broker, the bars show (from left to
right) its average (1) profit (2) income from consumption tariff subscribers (3) tariff
publication fees (proportional the number of tariffs published) (4) wholesale market
costs (5) balancing costs, and (6) energy distribution costs (proportional to the
4We excluded INAOEBroker; its large negative scores, caused by large tariff-publication fees,
affected the readability of the plots.
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Figure 5.1: Power TAC 2013 finals: average income and costs in 2-broker (top-left),
4-broker (top-right), and 7-broker games (bottom-right)
At a high level, TacTex-13’s wholesale market bidding policy and the tariff
market strategy induced by LATTE were responsible for TacTex-13’s success in the
finals. The wholesale market policy maintained low-costs, while the tariff market
strategy balanced its offered tariff prices with the resulting predicted demand to
optimize profits given the costs achieved by the wholesale policy. More specifically, in
the 2-broker games TacTex-13 made 32.4% and 88.2% more profits than the 2nd (cwi)
and 3rd (MLL) place brokers while maintaining similar levels of income-to-costs
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ratio (1.97), compared to cwi’s (2.07) and MLL’s (2.26). In Power TAC’s wholesale
market, energy unit-cost is typically an increasing function of the procured amount.
Despite that, TacTex-13 sold 50.5% and 72.5% more energy then cwi and MLL with
a competitive cost-per-kWh (4.4 cents/kWh) compared to cwi’s and MLL’s (4.6, 3.1
cents/kWh)5. It can be seen that the majority of TacTex-13’s costs were spent on
wholesale market procurement and (non-controllable) distribution fees. Therefore,
TacTex-13’s low cost-per-kWh is attributed to its wholesale market policy. At the
same time, given these costs, its tariff market strategy published tariffs at an average
rate that is slightly lower than cwi’s and slightly higher than MLL’s (8.8, vs 9.5 and
7.1 cents/kWh), which resulted in 39.0% and 113.6% more income compared to
cwi and MLL. In the 4-broker games, TacTex-13 traded 9% less energy comparing
to the 2-broker games, while maintaining similar average wholesale market costs.
Due to the stronger competition, TacTex-13’s income decreased by 61%, since its
tariff market strategy recognized it had to reduce prices (by 66.6%) to maximize its
profits. TacTex-13’s profits (and income) were higher by 38.1% (139.9%) and 404.5%
(542.2%) compared to cwi’s and MLL’s, while its income-to-cost ratio decreased to
1.28 compared to 1.62 and 1.39 of cwi and MLL. In the 7-broker games, TacTex-13’s
tariff strategy had to lower prices further, but also recognized a stopping point
beyond which it did not decrease rates. However, due to an underestimation of
the predicted costs, TacTex-13 ended up with losses despite having large customer
volume and income.
5.2.2 Controlled Experiments
We performed controlled experiments to identify the contribution of each of TacTex-13’s
major components. To do that, we generated test agents by disabling compo-
nents of TacTex-13 and comparing the resulting performance. Specifically, agent
5Not shown in the figure.
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U9 MDP LWR was the full TacTex-13 agent. Agent U9 MDP was generated from
U9 MDP LWR by removing the LWR-based customer-subscriptions prediction com-
ponent and replacing it with linear interpolation and conservative extrapolation,
thus modifying the implementation of PredictTariffEffects(). Agent U9 was gener-
ated from U9 MDP by disabling TacTex-13’s MDP-based instantiation of the func-
tion WholesaleBiddingPolicy() and replacing it with a baseline, randomized policy
that starts by trying lower buying prices and increasing them as time gets closer
to target timeslot. Agent U1 was generated from U9 by publishing 1, instead of
9, initial sample tariffs for probing customer tariff subscriptions, used by Algo-
rithm 3. Finally, a baseline agent B was generated from U1 by disabling LATTE’s
lookahead-based tariff market strategy and replacing it with a strategy that re-
acted to competitor tariffs by publishing slightly better rates. Specifically, LATTE’s
pseudo-code was degenerated by: (a) executing the code in the while loop (lines 3-20)
only once, (b) using the reactive tariff strategy to instantiate the abstract function
ComputeNextCandidateTariffAction(), (c) eliminating lines 23-24 which record utility,
and (d) replacing line 26 with a∗ ← a. The result was publishing tariffs based on
the reactive tariff strategy, and determining wholesale quantities to procure using
(the above modified implementation of) PredictTariffEffects() for these tariffs.
Table 5.2: Round-Robin ablation analysis.
B U1 U9 MDP
U9 MDP LWR 1278.3 (43.2) 708.9 (35.6) 34.2 (23.2)
U9 MDP 966.4 (40.5) 592.6 (22.2)
U1 547.4 (27.7))
We compared the above agents in two groups of experiments. The first group
was a 2-broker round-robin tournament between U9 MDP LWR, U9 MDP, U1 and
B. The second group compared the performance of all versions in 4-broker games
against a fixed set of opponents, composed of the 3 finalist broker binaries that were
available to us: cwiBroker, CrocodileAgent and Mertacor. In all of our experiments,
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each given combination of agents was tested over a fixed set of 200 full games.
Each game took about 2 hours of real-time (about 60 days of simulated time),
and was generated by loading a set of random-number seeds that initialized the
random number generators of the simulation, and a weather data file that completely
determined the simulated weather. We note that even after loading weather and
seeds, there was still some randomness of unknown source in the simulation. Each
weather file contained around 3 months of real-world weather, recorded in the default
location simulated by Power TAC. We used 8 different weather files (each file used
by 25 out of the 200 games), using the recording start dates of January, April, July,
October of 2009 and 2010, thus covering a period of 2 years. The simulator version
used in the experiments in this section is specified in Appendix A. The results of
the first group of experiments are reported in Table 5.2. Each entry in the table is
the mean score-difference (in 1000s) over the set of 200 games. The results of the
second group of experiments is reported in Table 5.3. Each of the 5 two-column
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sub-tables shows the results when playing one of our agent versions against the 3
finalist agents over the set of 200 games. Each entry shows the average score of each
agent, and rows are ordered by ranking.
In both groups, adding the tariff market strategy and the wholesale market
strategies resulted in significant improvements. Specifically, adding the tariff market
strategy resulted in the largest improvements (agent U1). The next largest improve-
ments were achieved when adding the wholesale market strategy (agent U9 MDP).
Adding the LWR-based prediction (U9 MDP LWR) seems to be beneficial only for
2-broker games, possibly since its less conservative extrapolations work better with
small number of competitors.
5.3 Chapter Summary
This chapter introduced TacTex-13, the champion power trading agent from the
Power TAC 2013 finals. TacTex-13 uses an instantiation of LATTE that works ef-
fectively in practice. This instantiation is restricted to selling energy in the tariff
market using fixed-rate tariffs, procuring energy solely in the wholesale market, and
aiming for zero imbalance. These restrictions result in a computationally efficient
implementation. TacTex-13 learns online to predict customer demand and wholesale
costs and to bid in the wholesale market, using representations that allow it to learn
with little data. In the 2013 finals, TacTex-13 won all of its 2-broker games and 15
out of the 16 4-broker games it completed successfully. Our experimental evaluation
showed that two of TacTex-13’s components were mainly responsible for its success:
its tariff market strategy, induced by LATTE’s lookahead, and its wholesale bidding
policy. We have released the binary of TacTex-13, and in can be found at the fol-
lowing webpage: http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/TacTex/. The next chapter
introduces TacTex-15, which improves upon TacTex-13’s demand prediction, cost
prediction, and wholesale bidding policy.
67
Chapter 6
TacTex-15: A Winning Power
Trading Agent
This chapter presents TacTex-151, which is by many metrics the best Power TAC
broker at the current time. Compared with TacTex-13, TacTex-15 presents three
strategic improvements in its instantiation of LATTE, specifically in (a) demand
prediction, (b) cost prediction, and (c) wholesale bidding policy. The first two
improvements enhance the approximate transition and reward functions used by
LATTE, and the third improvement enhances the implementation of the abstract
wholesale action used in LATTE’s lookahead. The strategic improvements are rel-
atively minor on the surface but result in large performance improvements. We
start with describing the TacTex-15 agent (Section 6.1). Next, in the results section
0This chapter is based on a conference paper [112] (to appear) that I wrote with Professor
Peter Stone. Author contributions were as follows: I was a Ph.D. student and did the complete
implementation, and Peter was my advisor and collaborated with me on deciding on research
directions and analyzing and interpreting results.
1TacTex-14 is not covered in this dissertation, since we consider it an exploratory work in
progress towards TacTex-15. TacTex-14 extends TacTex-13 with different demand and cost predic-
tors, specifically polynomial regression for customer subscription predictions and a non-parametric
cost-predictor. TacTex-14 used early withdraw penalties, which were effective in the 2014 ver-
sion of the simulator and became less effective in 2015. TacTex-14 is available to download from
http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/TacTex/
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(Section 6.2) we report TacTex-15’s performance in competitions (Section 6.2.1) and
in controlled experiments (Section 6.2.2), where using thousands of experiments we
analyze the performance of TacTex-15 and the reasons for its success. TacTex-15’s
binary and source code are publicly available (see Appendix A).
6.1 TacTex-15 Agent Description
TacTex-15 uses a restricted instantiation of LATTE that is similar to TacTex-13’s.
Similarly to TacTex-13, TacTex-15 procures power in the wholesale market, sells
power in the tariff market using fixed-rate tariffs, and aims for zero imbalance. Sim-
ilarly to TacTex-13’s case, the reward components Qprodt , p
prod
t , IB0,t, bal(IB0,t), Q
ask
t ,






t . Therefore TacTex-15’s instanti-
ation of LATTE is quite similar to TacTex-13’s. On the other hand, TacTex-15 intro-
duces three main improvements over TacTex-13, specifically in the instantiations of
LATTE’s abstract functions (a) PredictTariffEffects, (b) PredictWholesalePrice, and
(c) WholesaleBiddingPolicy. Improvements (a) and (b) result in a better transi-
tion and reward function models used by LATTE’s lookahead, and improvement
(c) enhances the implementation of an abstract action used by LATTE’s lookahead,
namely procuring a given energy quantity in the wholesale market. The function
PredictTariffEffects is instantiated using a new demand-predictor, and the function
PredictWholesalePrice is instantiated using a new cost-predictor, both are described
next along with TacTex-15’s new wholesale bidding policy.
6.1.1 Instantiating PredictTariffEffects: a New Demand-Predictor
TacTex-15 instantiates LATTE’s PredictTariffEffects function using a new demand-
predictor. This demand-predictor predicts customer subscription changes and fu-
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ture demand, which determine Qconst , p
cons
t , and Q
⊕cons
t in line 7 of Algorithm 1.
2
TacTex-13 learned a demand-predictor from data. In general, learning a demand-
predictor helps in adapting to new or changing environments, but in Power TAC
there is no need to do so: these complex stochastic customer behaviors are coded
in Power TAC’s open-source simulator. Instead, TacTex-15 uses the simulator’s
customer code as a basis for its demand-predictor. However, this code does not
provide a complete demand-predictor: it relies on information hidden from brokers.
TacTex-15 heuristically seeds this information to reasonable values: customers of
other brokers are assumed to be subscribed to the best tariffs, customer subscrip-
tions changes are predicted in the limit (expected values after infinite time, thus
ignoring customer inertia and limited-time tariff-binding fees), and customer de-
mand parameters are set to expected values. Using the customers’ code as a basis
for TacTex-15’s demand-predictor allows us to examine the importance of having an
accurate demand-prediction to the LATTE’s overall performance (see Section 6.2.2).
6.1.2 Instantiating PredictWholesalePrice: a New Cost-Predictor
As we have seen at the beginning of this chapter, in TacTex-15’s implementation




t (to remind, Q
bid
t is the quantity procured in
the wholesale market, Qwholesalet is the net quantity traded in the wholesale market,
and Qconst is the quantity consumed by TacTex-15’s customers; here we overload
notation and treat these variables as actual values when t is a past timeslot and as
predicted values when t is a future timeslot). This means that TacTex-15 predicts
its abstract wholesale actions to be procurement actions. Therefore, TacTex-15
implements PredictWholesalePrice(Qwholesalet , Q
⊕wholesale
t , t) using a wholesale cost-
predictor, which is described in this section.
TacTex-15’s cost-predictor needs to be learned, since costs are determined by
2TacTex-13 did not predict Q⊕const since it did not need it for its instantiation of LATTE.
TacTex-15 needs this information for predicting wholesale costs (see below).
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brokers’ bidding strategies and traded quantities, which are unknown in advance and
may change dynamically. Therefore, TacTex-15 learns and adapts a cost-predictor
online. A cost predictor ultimately needs to predict the price pbidt of procuring
a quantity Qbidt in the wholesale market. In a monopoly setup, where a single
broker bids to procure energy from generation companies, Qbidt is predictive of p
bid
t .
However, in a competitive environment with multiple brokers, using Qbidt by itself
does not provide enough information to reliably predict pbidt : p
bid
t is determined by
additional features such as the total quantities traded by other brokers; how each
of these quantities is divided between the 24 auctions in which energy is traded for
the target timeslot t; which brokers participate in each of the 24 auctions (since
each broker has its own bidding policy); whether some brokers resell energy they
had procured in earlier auctions due to customers migrating to their competitors;
and how customer subscriptions are divided among brokers (since it determines the
quantities brokers need to trade). This information is encapsulated in the state
variables S and A, and is hidden from TacTex-15.
To bypass the problem of predicting pbidt from unobserved features, TacTex-15
predicts pbidt from observable information that is assumed to be correlated with un-
observed information that causally affect these unobserved features and therefore
pbidt . Specifically, TacTex-15 assumes that given brokers’ bidding strategies: (i) most
of these unobserved features are causally determined by brokers’ predictions of their
customers’ consumption and production (one exception is customer subscriptions,
which likely determine brokers’ predictions), (ii) brokers’ predictions are correlated
with the actual consumption and production of their customers, and (iii) the ac-
tual consumption and production of competitors’ customers are correlated with
TacTex-15’s prediction of them. Therefore, TacTex-15’s cost-predictor predicts pbidt
from TacTex-15’s predictions of competitors’ production and consumption and of its
own customers’ consumption.
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TacTex-15 needs to learn such a cost-predictor from past data of actual con-
sumption, production and prices, but individual past consumption and production
of competitors’ customers are unobserved by TacTex-15. However, their past to-
tal consumption and total production are observed by TacTex-15: every broker
receives a report on the total consumption and production in each timeslot, so
TacTex-15 subtracts its customers’ consumption and production from these totals
to figure out competitors’ totals. Therefore, TacTex-15 learns to predict whole-
sale costs from its own and from competitors’ past total consumption and produc-
tion. Specifically, TacTex-15 learns a cost-predictor from past data of the form
〈Qconst , Q⊕const − Q
⊕prod






t 〉 → pbidt
with Qprodt = 0). To use this predictor to predict p
bid
t for a future timeslot t,
TacTex-15 needs to provide the features 〈Qconst , Q⊕const − Q
⊕prod
t 〉 for this future
timeslot; it does so using the predictions coming from the demand predictor. We
note that using informal experimentation, we confirmed that while Qbidt (and the cor-
respondingQconst ) is uncorrelated with p
bid
t , the combination 〈Qconst , Q⊕const −Q
⊕prod
t 〉
is correlated with pbidt .
TacTex-15’s instantiation of PredictWholesalePrice(Qwholesalet , Q
⊕wholesale
t , t)









t . Therefore the function
PredictWholesalePrice receives the features 〈Qconst , Q⊕const −Q
⊕prod
t 〉 as parameters.
TacTex-15 implements PredictWholesalePrice using an adaptive cost-predictor, which
has two components: a linear regression predictor trained on boot data (created once
in line 2 and used in line 6), and a real-time correction factor constructed from the
last 24 hours’ prediction errors (line 7). The boot data is sent by the simulator
at game start, and contains wholesale transactions made by a default simulated
broker as a single buyer in the market. This boot data serves as a basis for a
1-dimensional regression that maps wholesale quantities to prices (trained in line
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2). To be able to use this 1-dimensional regression, we construct a 1-dimensional
feature from Qwholesalet , Q
⊕wholesale
t by summing them. Since the correction factor
is constructed from little data (to ensure responsiveness), we limit it to bias correc-
tion. The boot data is larger (336 instances) so we use it to determine the slope.
TacTex-13’s cost-predictor ignored traded quantities, and predicted past average
prices based on time. We compare the two predictors in Section 6.2.2.
Algorithm 5 TacTex-15::PredictWholesalePrice(Qwholesalet , Q
⊕wholesale
t , t)
1: if firstTime then
2: cost-predictor.trainLinearRegression({〈Qbidt′ , pbidt′ 〉}t′∈bootdata)
3: firstTime ← false
4: return cost-predictor.predict(Qwholesalet +Q
⊕wholesale
t )
. The cost-predictor function used by PredictWholesalePrice
5: function cost-predictor.predict(Q)
6: price ← cost-predictor.getLinearRegression.predict(Q)
7: correctionFactor ← cost-predictor.averagePredictionErrorInLast24Hours()
8: return price - correctionFactor
6.1.3 Instantiating WholesaleBiddingPolicy
In the wholesale market, TacTex-15 hedges between truthful and strategic (i.e. non-
truthful) bidding. TacTex-15’s value of procured energy unit in the wholesale market
is the imbalance fee, which is the price TacTex-15 would pay if it takes no procure-
ment action. Therefore, a truthful bid by TacTex-15 would have a limit price of
the predicted imbalance fee, denoted here as p. By bidding truthfully, TacTex-15
would get the highest priority among competitors who bid less than p and would
never pay more than p. However, since the sequential double-auction mechanism is
not incentive compatible, truthful bidding is suboptimal in some situations. For in-
stance, when the truthful bid is setting the clearing price (i.e. when it is lowest-priced
cleared bid), bidding lower could be better (as long as it is above the highest-cleared
ask), since it reduces the clearing price.
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TacTex-13 used an optimistic strategic (i.e. non-truthful) sequential bidding
policy π(Q): it assumed that any bid with limit price higher than the clearing price
would result in procurement of the complete quantity specified in the bid. Therefore,
this policy set its limit prices to be slightly higher than the highest clearing price
it was willing to pay in each of the 24 MDP states. This policy is optimal in
some situations (e.g. single-buyer or cooperative setups), but can be exploited by
competitors who learn to bid slightly higher: such competitors could benefit from the
low prices this policy sets, while getting higher priority in the auction and therefore
getting a larger fraction of cheap energy than the user of this policy, whose bids
may end up being only partially cleared.
Since each of the two strategies is beneficial in different situations, TacTex-15
hedges between them. Let p be the limit price suggested by TacTex-13’s policy, and
ε be the minimum amount that can be traded (0.01 MWh in Power TAC). To bid
for a quantity Qbidt , TacTex-15 submits the following 25 orders (each order is of the





This policy benefits from both worlds: if TacTex-15 sets the price, it will either be
the strategic price p returned by π(Q), or the lowest among its higher bids. If
another broker sets the price, TacTex-15 will have a higher priority and benefit from
the lower price as long as it is not higher than p.
6.2 Results
We analyze TacTex-15’s performance in competitions (Section 6.2.1) and controlled
experiments (Section 6.2.2).
6.2.1 Competition Results: Power TAC 2015 Finals Analysis
The Power TAC 2015 Finals included 11 teams from universities in America, Eu-
rope and Asia. 230 games were played continually over a week, in three different
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sizes: 3-brokers, 9-brokers, and 11-brokers. A day after the finals ended, 8 of the
teams competed in a post-finals, demo-competition with 70 4-broker games. While
being unofficial, this competition was run similarly to the finals with one important
difference: a simulator-loophole that was exploited during the finals, was fixed. Due
to the proximity to the finals, and a parallel workshop, we believe that teams used
the same brokers they used in the finals.
Table 6.1 summarizes the 2015 finals results. While TacTex-15 was officially
ranked 2nd, it was the best broker that did not exploit a simulator-loophole: the
1st-ranked broker gained the highest overall score by exploiting a simulator loophole
in 3-broker games, which resulted in unrealistic dynamics and an unrealistically high
score that biased the final ranking (see dark gray cells in Table 6.1).3 Specifically,
Maxon15 subscribed customers to inflated tariffs which promised customers large
payments if customers unsubscribed from them after a period shorter than a single
timeslot. However, customers had no way to unsubscribe quickly enough (specifically
after less than a single timeslot) to collect the promised payments. Nevertheless, due
to the loophole, customers subscribed to these tariffs assuming they could collect
the payments, and paid inflated prices to Maxon15.
After the finals, the loophole was fixed. When replaying 3-broker competition
games without the loophole, Maxon15 no longer won by a large gap, but instead
lost by a large gap to TacTex-15. When taking into account only 11- and 9-broker
games from the finals (where the loophole had no impact), TacTex-15 ended 1st with
a total z-score of 0.142 ahead of CUHKTac and 0.551 ahead of Maxon15, finishing
slightly behind CUHKTac in 11-broker games (by 0.065) and ahead of CUHKTac
in 9-broker games (by 0.207). In the post-finals demo competition with a repaired
simulator, TacTex-15 won by a large gap ahead of the others (Table 6.2), making
50% more profits than the 2nd place (Maxon15). Maxon15 used the same strategy
3Maxon was not disqualified: they explained it as an unintended result of automatic parameter
tuning right before the finals.
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Table 6.1: Power TAC 2015 finals results. Ranking is determined by the “Total”
score, which is a sum of individual z-scores in each game size, displayed in the
columns “11-brokers” (10 games played by all brokers), “9-brokers” (45 games played
by each broker) and “3-brokers” (45 games played by each broker).
Broker 11-brokers 9-brokers 3-brokers Total
Maxon15 0.611 0.801 1.990 3.402
TacTex-15 0.897 1.066 0.258 2.221
CUHKTac 0.962 0.859 0.106 1.927
AgentUDE 0.421 0.367 0.809 1.597
Sharpy 0.429 0.614 0.521 1.564
COLDPower 0.726 0.397 -0.751 0.371
cwiBroker -0.002 -0.120 0.465 0.343
Mertacor 0.413 0.142 -1.341 -0.786
NTUTacAgent -1.017 -1.638 0.453 -2.202
SPOT -1.052 -0.243 -1.032 -2.327
CrocodileAgent -2.387 -2.244 -1.479 -6.111
Table 6.2: Power TAC 2015 post-finals demo competition results. 70 games
were played in a single game-size (4-brokers). Ranking is determined by z-score.










as before, but it was not as effective with the loophole fixed.4
Figure 6.1 shows an analysis of TacTex-15’s performance in the 2015 finals and
in the post-finals competition. In 11-broker games CUHKTac (1st) and TacTex-15
(2nd) won by a large gap over the other brokers, where most brokers ended with
losses. In 9-broker games TacTex-15 won by a large gap, making 30% more profit
than the 2nd place broker in this category (CUHKTac), despite missing 3 out of
45 games due to network connection problems. The revenue and costs plots show
that in 11- and 9-broker games TacTex-15 chose to reduce its market share, likely
due to the fierce competition, so that its revenue and costs were lower compared
with other top brokers, while its profit remained high. In 3-broker games TacTex-15
typically performed the best, although this is harder to see in the figure, due to
several events that biased the final averages: (a) Maxon15’s loophole-exploitation,
discussed above; (b) About 1/2 of AgentUDE’s, Sharpy’s and cwiBroker’s 3-broker
game scores come from single outlier games in which they played against a non-
functioning broker (Mertacor) and/or a competitor’s crash in a monopoly/duopoly
situation; (c) while NTUTacAgent did not exploit the simulator’s loophole, the
loophole indirectly inflated its final score (d) TacTex-15 missed 5 out of its 45 3-
broker games due to network connection problems, resulting in a score of 0 in these
games, and a reduction of 4.3% in TacTex-15’s average profit. In the 4-broker games
of the post-finals competition TacTex-15 made about 50% more profit than the 2nd
place broker. The revenue and costs plots show that it had a similar revenue to
the 2nd and 3rd place brokers, but much lower costs; higher revenue and lower
costs than the 5th, 6th brokers; and almost double the revenue of each of the other
brokers.
4To be fair, one should note that they did not retune their parameters to the repaired simulator.
On the other hand, it’s not clear that other parameters would have done particularly better in the




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 6.1: 2015 competition analysis: average profit, revenue and costs.
The top 3 lines respectively summarize 11-, 9-, 3-broker games from Power TAC
2015 finals; the bottom line summarizes the 4-broker games of the post-finals demo
competition. Each line shows average profit (left), revenue (middle), and costs
(right). 3-broker game results are biased due to (a) a simulator-loophole exploitation
by Maxon15; (b) an outlier game for AgentUDE, cwiBroker and Sharpy; (c) a
simulator-bug (NTUTacAgent); and (d) TacTex-15 missing 5 games due to network
problems. More details are in the text.
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6.2.2 Controlled Experiments
While the competition is motivating and its results are illustrative, it cannot isolate
specific broker components in a statistically significant way. We therefore subse-
quently tested TacTex-15 in thousands of games, in two types of controlled exper-
iments: (a) performance tests, and (b) ablation analysis tests, which evaluate the
contribution of TacTex-15’s main components to its overall performance. The sim-
ulator version used in the experiments in this section is specified in Appendix A.
Experimental Setup
Each experiment consisted of running 56 games against a set of opponent brokers,
using broker binaries of 2015 finalists. To better evaluate statistical significance, we
held most of the random factors in the simulation fixed across experiments (random
seeds, weather conditions). To fix weather conditions, we used weather files con-
taining 3 months of real-world weather. To cover year-round weather conditions we
used 8 weather files (each file used by 1/8 of the games) with start-dates of January,
April, July, October of 2009 and 2010.
Performance Tests
A successful broker should perform well in expectation against every set of op-
ponents, under different stochastic conditions (here weather/random seeds). At
the time of running the experiments, five 2015 finalists had released their brokers’
binaries. We used these binaries to test TacTex-15’s performance in 2, 3, 4, 5, 6-
broker games. We generated combinations of brokers for each game size, and tested
each combination in 56 games, as described above. Figure 6.2 presents the results.
















































































































































Figure 6.2: Performance of TacTex-15 against Power TAC 2015 finalists in
controlled experiments of game-sizes of 2-5. Each line represents the average
scores of a combination of brokers playing each other under a variety of conditions
(note the small error bars). Results are shown for game-sizes of 2-, 3-, 4-, 5-brokers
(top-left, top-right, bottom-left, bottom-right, respectively). Similar results for 6-




To understand the reasons for TacTex-15’s success, we tested the contribution of
TacTex-15’s main components to its overall performance, in all possible game-sizes
(2,...,6). We created three ablated versions of TacTex-15 by disabling each of its
main components. For each game size, we selected the “strongest” combination of
opponents, against which TacTex-15 had the lowest score. We tested each ablated
version against these opponents in a 56-game experiment, holding random seeds
and weather conditions fixed to the same values used against TacTex-15. When
disabling a component, we used as a baseline the corresponding component used by
TacTex-13 (since TacTex-15’s ablated version must have some component in place of
a disabled one to run properly). Figure 6.3 shows the results of our ablation analysis.
Disabling the cost-predictor (Abl-cost) did not have significant impact on TacTex-15’s
performance (however it can reduce performance, see Figure 6.8). Disabling the
wholesale-bidding policy (Abl-bid) significantly hurts TacTex-15’s performance: it
reduces TacTex-15’s score in game sizes 2, 4, 5, 6, and it causes TacTex-15 to either
lose its lead (in game sizes 2, 3) or have a smaller victory margin (in game sizes 4,
5, 6). Disabling the demand-predictor (Abl-demand) significantly hurts TacTex-15’s
performance: it drops TacTex-15’s score in all game sizes, and causes TacTex-15 to
either lose its lead (in game sizes 3, 5, 6) or have a smaller victory margin (in game
sizes 2, 4).
Ablation Analysis Extensions
To gain more insight into the importance of TacTex-15’s main components, we ex-
tended each ablation experiment. First, we extended TacTex-15’s demand-predictor
ablation analysis from a binary ablation test (disabled/enabled, see Abl-demand in
Figure 6.3) to a continuum of ablation-levels, thus testing TacTex-15’s sensitivity
to demand prediction errors. Figure 6.4 shows the performance-degradation as a
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Figure 6.3: Ablation analysis for 2-6 broker games. The performance of
TacTex-15 is compared with three of its ablated versions, when playing against the
strongest combination of opponents in each game size. Ablated versions are con-
structed from TacTex-15 by disabling cost predictor (Abl-cost), wholesale-bidding
policy (Abl-bid), and demand-predictor (Abl-demand). The left figure shows the av-
erage scores of each version in each game size; the right figure shows the average
score-differences of each version from opponents’ average score (y-axes’ scales are
the same).
function of ablation-level. We see that TacTex-15’s degrades quickly even for small
levels of ablation. We conclude that having an accurate demand-predictor is crucial
for the success of TacTex-15’s implementation of LATTE.
To better understand why the broker’s performance degraded when ablating
the demand-predictor, we examined more closely the games played by TacTex-15
(left-most point in Figure 6.4) and by Abl-demand (right-most point in Figure 6.4).
Figure 6.5 shows the revenue and cost components that compose the brokers’ score
(cash). In this figure, we see that: (a) Abl-demand pays more tariff publication fees
than TacTex-15 (by about 148K), (b) Abl-demand distributes (sells) more energy
than TacTex-15 , thus paying more distribution fees than TacTex-15 (by about 33K),
(c) energy selling income (from consumption tariffs, denoted ConsTariff) is similar
between TacTex-15 and Abl-demand, (d) energy procurement costs (wholesale and
balancing) are similar between TacTex-15 and Abl-demand. In addition, TacTex-15’s
average energy selling price was 4.3% higher than that of Abl-demand (7.45 vs. 7.14
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Figure 6.4: Performance as a function of ablation level of the demand-
predictor in 3-agent games. The plot shows the degradation in TacTex-15’s
performance as the ablation level of its demand predictor increases. To change
ablation level along a continuum, TacTex-15 uses a weighted combination of two
demand-predictors: (1) its own predictor, and (2) TacTex-13’s demand-predictor,
which was used by the ablated agent Abl-demand in Figure 6.3. Ablation level is
then represented as the relative weight given to predictor (2), so that a weight of 0
means “no-ablation”, and a weight of 1 means “full-ablation”.
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cents/kWh, not seen in the figure). We conclude that ablating the demand-predictor
(and using TacTex-13’s demand-predictor instead) causes the broker to publish too
many tariffs, at too low prices. This conclusion is confirmed by examining the
broker’s actions in a single game: Figure 6.6 shows how TacTex-15 stops publishing
tariffs early in the game, while Abl-demand keeps publishing tariffs and reducing
prices until the end of the game. Figure 6.7 shows that Abl-demand typically has a
larger number of customers than TacTex-15, however its profit is lower and flattens
toward the end of the game, while TacTex-15’s profit keeps increasing. We conclude
that ablating TacTex-15’s demand-predictor results in over-estimation of the utility
predicted for tariff price reductions, compared with the utility predicted for taking
no action.
Next, we extended the ablation analysis of TacTex-15’s wholesale-bidding
policy with additional comparisons against its ablated version (used by Abl-bid, see
Figure 6.3). Abl-bid’s policy (which is TacTex-13’s policy) can be viewed as more
cooperative than TacTex-15’s, since it submits lower bids, and thus may result in
lower costs against an opponent using a similar policy. To understand whether
Abl-bid’s cooperative policy is preferable in some situations, we created a payoff
matrix (Table 6.3) by running 2-broker games, testing both TacTex-15 and Abl-bid
in self-play and against each other. While Abl-bid’s cooperative policy indeed re-
sulted in lower costs in self-play (40 $/MWh vs. 57 $/MWh, a 29.8% reduction),
Abl-bid’s total scores in self-play were not higher than TacTex-15’s, since the com-
petitive selling policy reduced selling-prices further than TacTex-15’s, such that the
profit remained similar to TacTex-15’s. As a result, TacTex-15’s competitive policy
dominated Abl-bid’s cooperative policy in Table 6.3’s experiments.
We ran additional self-play experiments using 3-, 4-, 5-broker games. In
these cases Abl-bid’s more cooperative bidding policy resulted in higher scores than
































































































Figure 6.5: Demand-predictor ablation: revenue and cost components. The
bar charts show the average revenue and cost components when each of TacTex-15
(top) and its demand-predictor ablated version, (Abl-demand, bottom), played 3-
broker games against AgentUDE15 and cwiBroker15. The top bar chart corresponds
to the left-most point in Figure 6.4 and the bottom bar chart corresponds to the
right-most point in Figure 6.4.
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Figure 6.6: Demand-predictor ablation: broker behavior in an example
game. The plots show tariff publications throughout the game, in two repetitions of
a game using the same opponents, random seeds, and weather conditions, first with
TacTex-15 (top) and then with its demand-predictor ablated version (Abl-demand,
bottom). A tariff action is represented by the timeslot in which it took place (x-
axis), and by the tariff’s selling price (y-axis). A game normally starts at timeslot
360 (since timeslots 0-359 are “bootstrap” period).












































































Figure 6.7: Demand-predictor ablation: customers and profits in an ex-
ample game. The plot shows customer subscriptions (top row) and profits (cash,
bottom row) throughout a game, in the game-repetitions described in Figure 6.6.
The plots from the game played with TacTex-15 (top plot in Figure 6.6) are in the
left column, and the plots from the game played with Abl-demand (bottom plot in
Figure 6.6) are in the right column.
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period after game-start, during which selling-prices where higher than the eventual
equilibrium after which the profit of all brokers increased in the same pace.
Table 6.3: Payoff matrix of two wholesale-bidding strategies in 2-agent
games. The matrix shows a game-theoretic payoff matrix of two wholesale bidding
strategies: (a) Comp-Bid is TacTex-15’s competitive bidding policy, and (b) Coop-Bid
is Abl-bid’s (and TacTex-13’s) cooperative bidding policy from Figure 6.3. The ma-
trix entries show the average scores of agents using these strategies (TacTex-15 and











Finally, we extended TacTex-15’s cost-predictor ablation analysis. Even
though ablating TacTex-15’s cost predictor did not reduce performance against the
2015 finalists (Figure 6.3), we expect it to reduce performance when wholesale
costs change more dynamically. Figure 6.8 shows the result of such an experi-
ment, where TacTex-15 played against its cost-predictor ablated version (Abl-cost
from Figure 6.3), and was quicker to react to a drop in wholesale costs and thus
significantly won against Abl-cost.
6.3 Chapter Summary
This chapter introduced TacTex-15, which extends TacTex-13’s implementation of
LATTE. TacTex-15 consistently achieved top performance in Power TAC 2015 com-
petitions and in extensive controlled experiments. Specifically, (i) in the Power TAC
2015 finals it was the best agent that did not exploit a simulator loophole, (ii) in the
post-finals demo competition it won by a large gap over the rest of the agents, mak-



















Figure 6.8: Cost-predictor ablation in presence of abruptly changing
market-costs. The plot shows the average cumulative profit (with confidence
bounds) as a function of time in head-to-head games of TacTex-15 vs. its cost-
predictor ablated version (Abl-cost from Figure 6.3), when market costs abruptly
dropped in timeslot 1080 (mid-game). TacTex-15 was quicker to react due to its
more adaptive cost-predictor: it reduced selling prices, and thus gained market-
share and increased its profits. To create a market-cost drop effect, we could reduce
either the sellers’ asks, or the brokers’ bids. We implemented the latter (to avoid
changing the simulator), by making both brokers switch their bidding policies in
timeslot 1080 from competitive policies (of TacTex-15) to a cooperative policy (of
TacTex-13).
it significantly won against every combination of competitors. TacTex-15 improves
upon TacTex-13’s instantiation of LATTE in three main ways, where two of them
improve the predictive model used in LATTE’s lookahead (its demand-predictor and
cost-predictor) and one of them improves an implementation of an abstract action
used by LATTE (its wholesale bidding policy). These improvements turn out to
be critical to TacTex’s performance. Specifically, disabling its demand-predictor
and wholesale bidding policy reduced its performance in 2,3,4,5-broker games, and
disabling its cost-predictor reduced performance in games in which wholesale costs
changed abruptly. The next chapter describes an extension of TacTex-15’s implemen-
tation of LATTE, which searches over a superset of tariff actions that includes Time-
Of-Use tariffs, which are a proposed method for implementing demand-response in
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using Time-Of-Use Tariffs in a
Competitive Market
One of the milestones in the smart grid vision is “customer participation in power
markets through demand-side-management” [114]. Demand-side management (DSM)
refers to adapting customer demand to supply conditions. One of the main meth-
ods proposed for implementing DSM is Time-Of-Use (TOU) pricing [34, 49], which
specifies time-of-day-based electricity prices (e.g. hourly prices), in contrast to the
fixed prices that currently dominate retail electricity markets. As of the current
date, TOU pricing schemes are proposed to take effect in California starting Jan-
uary 2019 [91]. TOU pricing incentivizes customers to adapt their consumption and
shift portions of it to cheaper times. Shifting consumption can reduce customers’
costs while potentially increasing their discomfort.
0This chapter is based on a published conference paper [113] that I wrote with Professor Peter
Stone. Author contributions were as follows: I was a Ph.D. student and did the complete imple-
mentation, and Peter was my advisor and collaborated with me on deciding on research directions
and analyzing and interpreting results.
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In Power TAC, fixed pricing is implemented through fixed-rate tariffs, and
TOU pricing is implemented through TOU tariffs. Chapters 5 and 6 described two
successful instantiations of LATTE used by TacTex-13 and TacTex-15, which achieved
top performance in competitions and controlled experiments. These instantiations
sold electricity to retail consumers only through fixed-rate tariffs, in large part be-
cause the Power TAC simulator did not have demand-shifting customers until early
2015. This chapter describes a third instantiation of LATTE, called LATTE-TOU,
which extends these previous instantiations of LATTE by allowing the broker to use
TOU tariffs in the tariff market. The broker binaries and simulator versions used
in this chapter are publicly available, along with source code that can be configured
through text files to run LATTE-TOU and behave like these released binaries (see
Appendix A). This chapter’s primary contributions are:
• We enhance the Power TAC simulator’s consumers with demand-shifting ca-
pabilities, and enable demand-shifting for about 50,000 simulated consumers.
Specifically, we enhance Power TAC’s factored-customer models (Section 2.2.2)
(a) to evaluate a TOU tariff’s utility based on the cost and discomfort of the
predicted shifted-consumption under this TOU tariff, and (b) to allow for
different consumption profiles for different members of the population, each
based on the tariff the member is subscribed to.
• We extend LATTE to reason effectively about TOU Tariffs.
• We show that the problem of optimizing TOU tariffs in competitive markets is
intractable, and propose an efficient optimization algorithm that approximates
its solution. Our algorithm is fully implemented in a new instantiation of
LATTE, called LATTE-TOU, which is used by our broker agent.
• LATTE-TOU leads to 15% peak-demand reduction. To the best of our knowl-
edge, our work is the first to show that TOU can achieve the primary goal
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of peak-flattening in competitive markets in a large-scale, realistic simulation
such as Power TAC. Our agent’s peak-flattening results in greater profits
and/or profit-share and allows it to beat fixed-rate brokers, specifically the
1st and 2nd place agents from the 2014 Power TAC finals, while reducing the
electricity costs of both its customers and its competitors’ customers.
• Using extensive experimentation, we analyze several economic implications of
using TOU in competitive retail markets. For instance, while previous research
warned that TOU tariffs could induce customer-herding, our TOU broker pre-
vented it by implicitly coordinating flattening through profit-maximizing tar-
iffs. Our broker’s prevention of customer herding underlines a potential benefit
of employing autonomous TOU brokers in competitive power markets.
7.1 Background
This section elaborates on the motivation for DSM and TOU tariffs (Section 7.1.1),
and describes how Power TAC customers react to DSM using TOU tariffs (Sec-
tion 7.1.2).
7.1.1 Motivation: DSM and TOU Tariffs
A main motivator for DSM in general, and for TOU tariffs in particular, is the vari-
ability in electricity generation prices. Electricity generation prices depend on the
types of electricity generators used, which frequently depend on energy availabil-
ity and predicted daily demand patterns. Figure 7.1 shows the marginal electricity
generation costs as a function of generated power and generation type in three large
US wholesale markets: ERCOT, PJM, and CAISO. Since these marginal electric-
ity generation costs are the wholesale offer prices (asks) of generators, Figure 7.1
shows the costs of procuring electricity in the wholesale market. The figure demon-
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Figure 7.1: Generation-cost curves of three wholesale markets: ERCOT, PJM,
CAISO. Source: Brattle Report, pg. 18 http://www.ercot.com/content/news/
presentations/2013/Brattle%20ERCOT%20Resource%20Adequacy%20Review%
20-%202012-06-01.pdf
strates how increased generation results in more sharply increasing costs. Typical
daily customer demand has peaks, which thus result in high costs. One of the main
goals of DSM is reducing these peaks by flattening customer demand throughout the
day [96]. Demand-flattening (also called peak-flattening) can reduce both generation
costs, infrastructure costs, and CO2 emissions.
TOU tariffs, which specify different prices for different times of day, were
proposed for implementing DSM. Here we define a TOU tariff T to be a tuple
T := 〈p0, p1, · · · , p23〉, where pi is the electricity price in cents/kWh during hour-
of-day i. We refer to pi as hourly rate. A TOU tariff with varying hourly rates
incentivizes customers to adapt their consumption away from times of peak demand
in order to reduce their electricity costs.
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7.1.2 DSM in Power TAC
In Power TAC [87] as in real-world markets [1], when a tariff is published to the
market, customers respond in 3 ways.1 Responses 1 and 2 take place for any (fixed-
rate or non-fixed-rate) tariff publication, while response 3 takes place for non-fixed-
rate tariffs, such as TOU, as follows:
1. subscription changes: a portion of the customer population may change their
tariff subscriptions.
2. consumption elasticity : customers elastically adapt their total consumption
based on prices.
3. consumption shifting : customers may shift consumption from expensive to
cheap hours.
In competitive retail markets, TOU tariffs may need to compete with fixed-
rate tariffs, which sell energy for a fixed price per unit. Fixed-rate tariffs do not
affect customers’ comfort, since customer payments are determined solely by the
total energy consumed, regardless of when it is consumed. In contrast, under TOU
tariffs customers face a trade-off between cost and comfort: to save costs, they may
need to change their consumption patterns. Customers will subscribe to a TOU
tariff and change consumption if the potential cost saving compared with competing
fixed-rate tariffs is large enough to compensate for the extra discomfort.
In Power TAC, about 90% of the consumption is done by factored-customer
models, which represent populations of customers (See Section 2.2.2). Factored-
customers model the cost-comfort trade-off as follows [87]. A customer has a default
energy profile eH , which is a vector of desired consumption values up to some horizon
1Since Power TAC customers are autonomous agents representing their human owners, they
respond at a higher frequency than a typical human. This setup is expected to reflect future mar-
kets with high penetration of home automation systems, and with autonomous agents optimizing
residential consumption.
94
H. Let ēH be a modified energy profile defined by some admissible permutation of
eH . Intuitively, an admissible permutation is a modified energy profile that satisfies
the customer’s constraints on how energy can be shifted, for instance not consuming
below a customer’s minimum required demand at any time, and shifting only por-
tions of demand that are flexible. The discomfort implied by an admissible permu-
tation ēH is quantified using a distance metric defined on profile vectors: d (eH , ēH).
Power TAC currently uses the L2 distance metric d (eH , ēH) :=
∑
t=1:H (et − ēt)
2,
and we find that it has desirable strategic effects, which we elaborate on later. Let
cost (T, ēH) be the cost paid by a customer consuming energy according to ēH un-
der a tariff T . Let w be a constant weighting the importance of cost vs. discomfort.
Then the customer’s utility of subscribing to tariff T and consuming according to
ēH is ucust (T, ēH) := − (cost (T, ēH) + w × d (eH , ēH)).
Customers optimize ēH to maximize their utility under a given tariff to which
they are subscribed. This formulation assumes a baseline maximum utility of 0
corresponding to the customer using energy for free and consuming according to its
desired energy profile. For a customer cust subscribed to a tariff T , the optimal
consumption profile is e∗H := arg maxēH ucust (T, ēH), and the utility of tariff T as
(overloading notation) ucust (T ) := ucust (T, e
∗
H). For any fixed-rate tariff Tfixed,
all permutations have the same price, so by the above definitions e∗H = eH , and
ucust (Tfixed) := −cost (Tfixed, eH). Therefore, for a given TOU tariff Ttou and a
fixed-rate tariff Tfixed, the utility of Ttou for a customer cust is higher than that of
Tfixed (i.e. ucust (Ttou) > ucust (Tfixed)), when − (cost (Ttou, e∗H) + w × d (eH , e∗H)) >
−cost (Tfixed, eH), i.e. when it saves enough cost to overcome the extra discomfort.
7.2 Our Contribution to DSM in Power TAC
Section 7.1.2 described how Power TAC’s factored-customer consumers currently
respond to tariff publications and specifically to DSM using TOU tariffs. Part of
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this implementation was contributed by us, as follows. Until early in the year 2015,
the consumers’ demand-shifting code was disabled in the Power TAC simulator.
This code was implemented as described in [87] and could work in a restricted
setup, but needed several enhancements to work in a full game in the way described
in the previous section. We enhanced the code to work in a full game, as follows.
First, consumers originally evaluated the utility of candidate tariffs using
their default consumption profile, thus implicitly assuming that they would not
shift their consumption. We enhanced consumers to evaluate each TOU tariff using
their utility-maximizing shifted consumption profile under this tariff. To find a
utility-maximizing shifted consumption profile, customers use the same code that
they use for shifting consumption under an actual submission.
Second, customers originally treated all TOU tariffs as equally uncomfortable
(using a fixed constant to account for the discomfort of any TOU tariff). However,
a TOU tariff that requires small consumption-shifting should be considered less
uncomfortable than a TOU tariff that requires large consumption-shifting. We en-
hanced consumers to account for a TOU tariff’s discomfort based on the amount of
shifting in their utility-maximizing shifted profile under this tariff. The amount of
shifting is measured as the L2 distance between a consumer’s desired and shifted
consumption profiles, as was described in Section 7.1.2.
Third, factored-customer models that represent large populations can sub-
scribe subsets of their populations to different tariffs. The original implementation
of demand-shifting found a single shifted consumption profile per factored-customer,
which maximized utility over all tariffs subscribed by the population. As a result,
different population members consumed according to the same consumption pro-
file, even if they were subscribed to radically different TOU tariffs. We enhanced
factored-customers to allow different population members to have different consump-
tion profiles, where each profile is optimized based on a single tariff to which the
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member is subscribed.
Finally, we enabled the corrected demand-shifting for about 50,000 residential
customers and 25 office buildings in the simulation, tested it thoroughly, and fixed
a few small issues to achieve the behavior described in Section 7.1.2.
7.3 Challenges of Using TOU Tariffs in Competitive
Markets
Section 7.1.1 stated that TOU could help to flatten demand, and thus reduce in-
frastructure costs, generation costs, and CO2 emissions. While reduced-costs and
emissions could increase social welfare, it is interesting to ask whether TOU tar-
iffs can benefit a self-interested autonomous broker agent, and explore the broker’s
incentives to use them. This section characterizes the incentives and challenges in
using TOU by a broker in a competitive market.
Since TOU tariffs are less attractive for customers than fixed-rate tariffs,
they are not expected to increase the broker’s revenue; instead, they can benefit the
broker by reducing its costs, thus making the broker more competitive so that the
broker could potentially increase its profit. Therefore, there are two basic conditions
that need to be met for a TOU tariff to be more beneficial for a broker than the
best fixed-rate tariff:
Condition 1 TOU tariff should reduce the broker’s expected costs compared with
the best fixed-rate tariff this broker could publish.
Condition 2 TOU tariff’s reduced costs should result in larger expected profit than
the best fixed-rate tariff this broker could publish.
Note that the second condition is necessary, since a broker might design TOU tariffs
that reduce costs and revenue, such that the profit does not necessarily increase
compared with the best fixed-rate tariff.
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In monopolistic retail markets the surplus resulting from reduced wholesale
electricity costs directly benefits the monopoly and possibly the customers. In con-
trast, in competitive markets this surplus might benefit the competitors (even if
they do not use TOU tariffs), since wholesale electricity costs are typically a func-
tion of the total quantity bought, due to the wholesale auction structure. As a
result, brokers using fixed-rate tariffs can enjoy the reduced prices resulting from
peak-flattening by another broker using TOU tariffs, while at the same time gaining
market share from this TOU broker due to the extra discomfort that TOU tariffs
incur on customers.
This chapter focuses on two questions. First, how should an autonomous
broker optimize TOU tariffs that are both 1) attractive to customers in a competitive
retail market with fixed-rate tariffs and 2) more profitable for the broker than the
best fixed-rate tariffs? Second, what is the economic impact of TOU tariffs in a
competitive market?
7.4 LATTE-TOU
This section views LATTE as executing a black-box optimization, and describes our
instantiation of LATTE that uses TOU tariffs, called LATTE-TOU.
7.4.1 LATTE as a Black-Box Optimization
LATTE can be viewed as executing a black-box optimization problem at every step:
the inputs to this optimization problem are tariff and wholesale action combinations;
the optimized objective is the predicted utility over the lookahead horizon; and an
objective evaluation is computed using a lookahead trajectory that uses the transi-
tion and reward function models, implemented in the functions predictTariffEffects
and PredictWholesalePrice. The black-box refers to the lookahead computation that
returns a predicted utility for a given action-combination input.
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In all of our instantiations, an action-combination input to LATTE’s black-
box evaluation is completely determined by the tariff action in the combination:
since our LATTE instantiations aim for zero supply-demand imbalance, wholesale
actions (quantities to procure) are determined to be the predicted demand for the
candidate tariff action. Therefore, our instantiations of LATTE’s black-box opti-
mization is actually performed over candidate tariff actions, which are determined
by the function ComputeNextCandidateTariffAction.
In our previous instantiations of LATTE (Algorithm 1 in Chapter 4), the
function ComputeNextCandidateTariffAction generated a set of fixed-rate candidate
tariffs (line 5 of LATTE), which were evaluated (along with the corresponding whole-
sale actions) by LATTE’s black-box optimization (lines 6-24 of LATTE) to determine
the best tariff action to execute. Here we would like to extend LATTE’s lookahead
to search over TOU tariff actions in addition to fixed-rate tariffs.
From an optimization perspective, TOU tariffs present at least three chal-
lenges. First, optimizing a TOU tariff requires searching over a multi-dimensional
space: while a fixed-rate tariff has only one continuous price to optimize, a TOU tar-
iff is composed of 24 continuous prices. Moreover, these 24 prices must be optimized
in conjunction: changing a single price can affect customer-demand throughout the
lookahead horizon due to subscription changes and demand-shifting effects (rather
than changing demand just in the timeslot for which this price is effective). Sec-
ond, a broker can only evaluate a limited number of candidates, due to a real-time
constraint on computation. Third, this 24-dimensional optimization is generally
intractable: effects such as subscription-changes and consumption-shifting create
discontinuities and local maxima in the predicted-utility objective, so that finding
a global optimum is generally intractable.
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7.4.2 LATTE-TOU
Due to the real-time constraint on computation, an instantiation of LATTE that
uses TOU tariffs needs to efficiently and effectively sample 24-dimensional TOU
tariff candidates to evaluate (addressing challenge (i) from Chapter 3). Due to
intractability, we resort to finding a local optimum. Our instantiation of LATTE
that uses TOU tariffs is called LATTE-TOU. LATTE-TOU is mostly identical to
TacTex-15’s instantiation of LATTE, with two exceptions. First, it can reason about
TOU tariffs by using the shifting consumers models (described in Section 7.1.2) to
predict customer subscription changes and future consumption. Second, it intro-
duces a new instantiation of the function ComputeNextCandidateTariffAction, which
generates candidate TOU tariffs based on a local search that uses LATTE’s black-box
evaluation.
Before describing the instantiation of ComputeNextCandidateTariffAction used
by LATTE-TOU, we note that we tried other instantiations by plugging-in well-
known local search methods such as Amoeba, BOBYQA, and Powell’s method. All
these methods failed to converge under the real-time constraint on computation, and
resulted in ineffective TOU tariffs published to the market. Therefore, we designed
an empirical gradient-ascent algorithm, which efficiently found a local optimum in
our experiments.
Algorithm 6 describes the instantiation of ComputeNextCandidateTariffAction
as a gradient-ascent algorithm, used by LATTE-TOU. Line 1 maintains a counter
counting the number of calls to ComputeNextCandidateTariffAction. The algorithm
has three phases, where the current phase is determined by the number of calls to the
function. Phase 1 (lines 2-4) returns fixed-rate candidates similarly to TacTex-13’s
and TacTex-15’s instantiations of LATTE. The goal of this phase is to find the best
fixed-rate candidate to serve as a seed for the local TOU optimization phase. Phase
2 (lines 5-20) returns candidates for computing a 2-sided, empirical gradient. Lines
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Algorithm 6 LATTE-TOU::ComputeNextCandidateTariffAction()
. numCalls counts the number of calls to this function
1: numCalls ← numCalls + 1
. Phase 1: return fixed-rate tariffs, like TacTex-13 and TacTex-15
2: if numCalls < numFixedRateCandidates then
3: fixedRateCandidate ← TacTex-13::ComputeNextCandidateTariffAction()
4: return fixedRateCandidate
. Phase 2: the next 48 calls generate candidates for 2-sided gradient estimation
5: if numCalls == numFixedRateCandidates then
6: fixedRateSeed ← FindBestFixedRateTariff()
7: 〈p, p, · · · , p〉 ← ConvertToTOUTariff(fixedRateSeed) . vector of length 24
8: numTOUCalls ← numCalls − numFixedRateCandidates
9: if numTOUCalls < 48 then
10: i← bnumTOUCalls2 c
11: if numTOUCalls is even then
12: return (〈p, .., p, p+ ε, p, .., p〉) . ε added to i’th entry
13: else
14: return (〈p, .., p, p− ε, p, .., p〉) . ε subtracted from i’th entry
. Estimate 2-sided empirical gradient (once)
15: if numTOUCalls == 48 then
16: for i in 1, . . . , 24 do
17: u+i ← RetrieveUtility(〈p, .., p, p+ ε, p, .., p〉) . ε added to i’th entry
18: u−i ← RetrieveUtility(〈p, .., p, p− ε, p, .., p〉) . ε subtracted from i’th entry













20: P ← 〈p, p, · · · , p〉
. Phase 3: walk along gradient
21: P ← P + 〈ε1, ε2, · · · , ε24〉
22: return P
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5-7 find the fixed-rate candidate with the highest utility (as computed and stored in
line 24 of LATTE), and use it as a seed for the local optimization, converting it into a
TOU tariff with 24 identical prices. Lines 9-14 generate one of the 48 candidates for
gradient-estimation, by perturbing each of the 24 prices by ±ε (in our experiments
ε = 0.5cents/kWh, selected based on informal testing to be of a similar scale to
price changes during a game). Next, a 2-sided gradient is computed from the 48
perturbations and is normalized to a length of ε (lines 15-19). In line 20, we initialize
the current point in the gradient-ascent P to the fixed-rate seed. In phase 3 (lines
21-22), each following candidate is generated by taking a step along the computed
gradient. This phase is ended externally, by LATTE’s Done() function, either after
a local minimum has been reached, or when time is up.
Ideally, we would compute a new gradient before every step taken during
phase 3. However, the real-time constraint on computation time prevents us from
doing so: it allows us to evaluate a total of about 70 candidate tariffs, while each
gradient estimation requires 48 evaluations. A more sample-efficient gradient esti-
mation method such as the policy gradient employed by [51] could be explored in
the future. Due to the limitation of about 70 evaluations we also had to reduce
the number of evaluated fixed-rate candidates: we did it by using a binary-search
over fixed-rate prices, so that instead of evaluating all 100 candidates generated by
TacTex-13’s instantiation, we evaluated about 8 fixed-rate candidates.
7.5 Results
We evaluated our TOU broker which uses LATTE-TOU using paired tests. We
measured the impact of modifying a component of the broker by testing the original
and the modified version in a set of games, in which the opponents and most random
factors in the simulation were held fixed (random seeds, weather conditions). Paired
testing improves our ability to evaluate the statistical significance of the results,
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by allowing us to use the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test instead of an
unpaired test. To fix weather conditions, we used weather files containing 3 months
of real-world weather. To cover year-round weather conditions we used 8 weather
files (each file used by 1/8 of the games) with start-dates of January, April, July,
October of 2009 and 2010. Opponents were fixed to be one of the top brokers
played in the Power TAC 2014 finals: AgentUDE (1st place), and CWIBroker (2nd
place). The simulator version used in the experiments in this section is specified in
Appendix A.
7.5.1 Impact of LATTE-TOU on Broker’s Performance and on the
Economy
We tested how using TOU tariffs optimized with LATTE-TOU affected 1) the bro-
ker’s performance. and 2) the economy. We compared our TOU Broker which uses
LATTE-TOU with two variations: one that uses fixed-rate tariffs and another that
uses a naive TOU tariff optimization. We refer to these brokers as TacTex-TOU,
FixedRate, and TOUNaive. FixedRate was created from TacTex-TOU by disabling
phase 2 and 3 of ComputeNextCandidateTariffAction, and using the fixed-rate tar-
iff returned by phase 1 (line 1). TOUNaive was created from TacTex-TOU as
follows. Phase 2 and 3 of ComputeNextCandidateTariffAction were replaced with
a phase that naively assigns higher rates to hours with higher predicted costs,
by adding a fixed margin to these predicted costs. Specifically, given a fixed-
rate tariff with rate p returned by phase 1, and given a predicted cost vector
for the next 24 hours (c+1, . . . , c+24), the naive algorithm computes an average
margin m := 124
∑+24
i=+1(p − ci), and publishes a TOU tariff with the price vector
P = (c+1 + m, . . . , c+24 + m). All other broker components remained identical
between the three brokers. We compared these three brokers in 2 different exper-
iments of 200 games each: (1) playing against AgentUDE and (2) playing against
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CWIBroker, both of which use only fixed-rate tariffs.
Table 7.1 shows the results of these two experiments. Each row shows
a measured quantity averaged over games played by FixedRate, TOUNaive and
TacTex-TOU, as well as the relative change in this quantity when using TacTex-TOU
instead of FixedRate. All results are statistically significant with p = 0.01 (many
with p  0.01), using the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test. TacTex-TOU
was the only agent that earned a higher score than both competitors (by 9% and
70% gaps against CWIBroker and AgentUDE respectively). TOUNaive was domi-
nated by TacTex-TOU in the sense that it made less profit against both opponents,
and lost to CWIBroker.
Compared with FixedRate, TacTex-TOU either earned more profit (against
AgentUDE), or increased its profit-share from losing to winning (against CWIBro-
ker, although with lower profits), while reducing peak demand by around 15%.
TacTex-TOU’s peak reduction reduced the electricity costs for both brokers and cus-
tomers (including competitors’), and therefore increased social welfare. The surplus
resulting from peak-reduction benefited either brokers or customers, depending on
broker strategies. When playing against CWIBroker, customers enjoyed a 9.5%
cost reduction, and brokers’ suffered profit reduction, due to a fierce price-reduction
competition. On the other hand, when playing against AgentUDE, brokers did not
reduce prices as much; customers’ cost reduction was only 1%, while brokers’ profits
increased. Since our broker plays a best-response strategy, the difference depends
on how cooperative the other broker is.
Table 7.2 shows the results of running TacTex-TOU against itself. It achieved
the best flattening (around 20% and 5% peak reduction compared with FixedRate
and TacTex-TOU), and the lowest price for customers (around 5%-20% savings
compared with FixedRate and TacTex-TOU). However, in this case TacTex-TOU
achieved the lowest profit of all brokers due to a fierce price-reduction competition.
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Table 7.1: FixedRate, TOUNaive and TacTex-TOU competing in 2-broker games
against AgentUDE, CWIBroker (TacTex-TOU is denoted TOU).
(a) Fixed-Rate-vs-UDE (b) TOUNaive-vs-UDE (c) TOU-vs-UDE Change (c)/(a)
score: our-agent (M$) 1.893 1.689 1.922 1.016 (+1.6%)
score: UDE (M$) 0.895 0.578 1.122 1.253 (+25.3%)
market-share: our-agent (%) 64.0 73.3 61.4 0.959 (-4.1%)
(our) avg electricity-buy price 0.053 0.051 0.051 0.963 (-3.7%)
(our) avg electricity-sell price 0.105 0.098 0.105 1.000 (-0.0%)
(all) avg electricity-buy price 0.051 0.049 0.049 0.961 (-3.9%)
(all) avg electricity-sell price 0.105 0.099 0.104 0.990 (-1.0%)
peak-demand (MW) 86.771 71.882 73.519 0.847 (-15.3%)
(a) Fixed-Rate-vs-CWI (b) TOUNaive-vs-CWI (c) TOU-vs-CWI Change: (c)/(a)
score: our-agent (M$) 0.677 0.524 0.622 0.919 (-8.1%)
score: CWI (M$) 0.771 0.620 0.558 0.724 (-27.6%)
market-share: our-agent (%) 44.2 54.3 54.7 1.238 (+23.8%)
(our) avg electricity-buy price 0.057 0.054 0.054 0.947 (-5.3%)
(our) avg electricity-sell price 0.095 0.087 0.086 0.905 (-9.5%)
(all) avg electricity-buy price 0.057 0.055 0.053 0.930 (-7.0%)
(all) avg electricity-sell price 0.094 0.086 0.086 0.915 (-8.5%)
peak-demand (MW) 86.701 74.720 73.651 0.849 (-15.1%)
Table 7.2: Self-play (TacTex-TOU vs TacTex-TOU), compared with TacTex-TOU vs
AgentUDE, and TacTex-TOU vs CWIBroker (TacTex-TOU is denoted TOU).
(d) TOU-vs-TOU Change (d)/(c) (UDE) Change (d)/(c) (CWI)
score: our-agent (M$) 0.493 0.257 (-74.3%) 0.791 (-20.9%)
score: agent-copy (M$) 0.482 – –
market-share: our-agent (%) 50.5 0.823 (-17.7%) 0.927 (-7.3%)
(our) avg electricity-buy price 0.051 1.000 (-0.0%) 0.944 (-5.6%)
(our) avg electricity-sell price 0.083 0.790 (-21.0%) 0.954 (-4.6%)
(all) avg electricity-buy price 0.051 1.041 (+4.1%) 0.944 (-5.6%)
(all) avg electricity-sell price 0.083 0.798 (-20.2%) 0.954 (-4.6%)
peak-demand (MW) 70.101 0.954 (-4.6%) 0.947 (-5.3%)
TacTex-TOU’s best-response self-play benefited customers but not the broker. This
illustrates game-theoretic considerations pointed out by [63], whereby cooperative
brokers could make higher profits, in this case by enjoying more of the surplus
created by peak-reduction, at the expense of customers.
Figure 7.2 shows how the market power of a TOU broker affects its ability
to flatten demand. All plots show consumption over 24 simulated hours. The left,
middle, right columns show FixedRate, TOUNaive and TacTex-TOU playing against
CWIBroker. Peak demand is around 90MW, 80MW, and 70MW respectively (top
row). TacTex-TOU’s large market share allowed it to counter-balance CWIBroker’s
customers’ peaked-demand, while TOUNaive was only partially successful in doing so
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due to both lower market share (middle row), and suboptimal TOU pricing (bottom
row).
TacTex-TOU’s frequent replanning using LATTE-TOU prevented customer
herding (many customers shifting consumption to times with the lowest price, caus-
ing a new peak [83]). Even though we disabled two main customer-components
for addressing herding (bundle-based optimization and stochastic shifting [87]) and
let customers shift greedily to their utility-maximizing electricity profile, no herding
was observed, due to a combination of (1) a TOU broker that implicitly coordinated
flattening through profit-maximizing tariffs (Figure 7.2c, right), and (2) a smooth
discomfort metric dist (eH , e
∗
H). This coordinated flattening underlines a potential
benefit of employing TOU brokers in competitive markets.
7.5.2 Robustness of TOU to Prediction Errors
We tested the robustness of TacTex-TOU to errors in its consumption-shifting pre-
dictions. Table 7.3 compares profits and peak-demand when testing 2 variations
of TacTex-TOU against CWIBroker. We chose CWIBroker as an opponent against
which TacTex-TOU had smaller profit margins (see Table 7.1), so accurate predic-
tions seem important. The left column shows the results of TacTex-TOU, copied
from Table 7.1, as a reference. The NoShift broker was created from TacTex-TOU
by disabling the consumption-shifting prediction module, and the FlatCost broker
was created by adding noise to cost-prediction, making it predict a flatter cost-curve
slope. Based on Table 7.3, the consumption-shifting prediction module is critical to
both earning profits and peak-flattening: without it TacTex-TOU lost to CWIBroker
by about a 10% gap, and peak-demand was barely reduced compared to FixedRate.
Similarly, when the predicted cost-curve was too flat, TacTex-TOU lost with negative
profit and almost no flattening.
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(a) Total consumption over 24 hours.





































































(b) Per-broker consumption over 24 hours.







































(c) Active tariffs over 24 hours.
Figure 7.2: Consumption flattening: FixedRate (left column), TOUNaive (middle),
TacTex-TOU (right).
Table 7.3: Ablation analysis: erratic-predictions
TacTex-TOU NoShift FlatCost
score: our-agent (M$) 0.622 0.507 -0.007
score: CWI (M$) 0.558 0.550 0.210
peak-demand (MW) 73.651 83.728 82.779
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7.6 Chapter Summary
We formalized the problem of TOU tariff optimization in competitive retail markets,
and proposed a real-time gradient-based, utility-optimization (profit-maximization)
algorithm that approximates its solution. Our algorithm is fully implemented and
tested extensively in the Power TAC simulator. Our gradient algorithm is currently
the only TOU algorithm that performs robustly in Power TAC’s complex, realistic
environment: both a naive approach (TOUNaive) and well-known optimization al-
gorithms failed to improve upon our fixed-rate broker and/or to outperform the top
2014 brokers.We have shown that TOU tariffs can compete successfully with fixed-
rate tariffs: our TOU broker agent outperformed the top 2 broker agents of the
Power TAC 2014 finals, reduced peak-demand by 15% compared with using only
fixed-rate tariffs, increased its profits and/or profit-share, and saved costs for all
customers (including competitors’). Our ablation analysis showed the importance
of having accurate customers shifting-predictions and cost-curve predictions.
While TOU tariffs can induce customer-herding, our TOU broker prevented
it by implicitly coordinating flattening through profit-maximizing tariffs. This co-
ordinated flattening underlines a potential benefit of employing autonomous TOU
brokers in competitive power markets. In addition, we have seen that a TOU bro-
ker’s customer share is an important factor in its ability to flatten demand: to
counter-balance peaked consumption of fixed-rate brokers’ customers, it needs to
gain large customer-share by creating attractive TOU tariffs that are still prof-
itable. Finally, our experiments demonstrated game-theoretic issues that affect the
distribution of surplus created by reduced costs. An important direction for future





This main motivation for this dissertation is exploring how modern artificial in-
telligence (AI) techniques can contribute to society’s shift towards wide scale de-
ployment of smart grids, which make electricity power distribution more efficient
and flexible. As such, this dissertation makes contributions within both the general
field of AI, and to the literature on smart grids and electricity markets. Within
AI, it is particularly situated with in the subfield of multiagent systems (MAS).
Figure 8.1 illustrates how Power TAC, the substrate domain of this dissertation,
fits into these research areas: it lies at their intersection, and inside the Trading
Agent Competitions (TAC) area, which lies inside the Agent-based Computational
Economics (ACE) area, which lies inside MAS. This section reviews research that
is most related to this dissertation within these fields.
Before reviewing related work, we note that this dissertation also contributes
to the broad field of computational sustainability. The call for starting a new re-
search area of computational sustainability was made by Gomes [23]. In this paper,
the author described the need to harness computational resources to address envi-
ronmental issues, including management of natural resources such as energy, for the
benefit of current and future generations. Power TAC’s research goals include using
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Figure 8.1: Dissertation contribution areas.
autonomous agents for the benefit of sustainable energy, and therefore, in addition
to the areas shown in Figure 1, it also falls within the area of computational sus-
tainability. The literature on computational energy sustainability has been growing
rapidly and includes applications such as smart home heating, micro-storage man-
agement, wind forecasting, wind turbine optimization, energy disaggregation, solar
tracking, electric vehicle charging and others [89, 122, 121, 40, 119, 21, 128, 61, 60,
59, 38, 129, 54, 53, 55, 52, 70, 41, 117].
In the rest of this section we overview related work based on the numbered
regions in Figure 8.1. Specifically, we overview research in smart grid and electricity
markets, with a special focus on Time-Of-Use tariffs and demand-side management
(Region 1, Section 8.1); MAS applications for the smart grid (Region 2, Section 8.2);
Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) in the context of electricity markets
(Region 3, Section 8.3); other Trading Agent Competitions (TAC) (Region 4, Sec-
tion 8.4); and Power TAC (Region 5, Section 8.5).
8.1 Smart Grid and Electricity Markets
The need for a smart grid and its potential benefits have been laid out in official
policy documents [114, 108] as well as academic research (e.g. [2]). Basic background
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on power market economics can be found in the book Power System Economics [99].
Electricity markets are going through a major transition from traditional, regulated
monopolies into deregulated, competitive markets [35]. At the same time, customers
are being engaged in power markets, to incentivize flexible demand that adapts
to supply conditions [114]. These major changes create new challenges in power
markets design. In the context of these challenges, we have especially focused on
Time-Of-Use tariffs (Chapter 7). We survey related work in this area next.
8.1.1 Time-Of-Use Tariffs and Demand-Side Management
Adapting electricity demand to supply conditions can be beneficial from different
reasons, some of them were listed back in the 1980s [96]. An analysis of the California
Energy Crisis concluded that the risk of such a crisis could be greatly mitigated by
customer demand that responds to electricity prices [7]. Demand-side management
(DSM) is viewed as an important component of future smart grids [114]. Until
recently, the technological infrastructure that is needed for implementing DSM was
missing, but with recent advances, such as smart-meter installations at customer
homes, different forms of DSM are expected to be implemented in the relatively near
future. A taxonomy of DSM is provided by Palensky et al. [68], which additionally
overviews several demonstration projects. DSM can be implemented through (a)
direct load control methods (e.g. [8]), in which customers give electric utilities direct
control over their devices and the option to turn them off to reduce load; or (b)
indirect methods, such as pricing-based incentives.
In recent years, two types of pricing-based DSM have attracted growing
attention both in academia and in industry: Time-Of-Use (TOU) tariffs, and Real-
Time-Pricing (RTP) tariffs [130, 15, 16, 127, 10, 95, 65, 11]. TOU tariffs were
used for a long time in various countries for large customers, e.g. by Electricite de
France as far back as 1956 [12]. With recent advances, such as demand-side smart-
111
metering for residential customers, TOU pricing schemes have been considered for
residential use. For example, as of the current date, residential TOU pricing schemes
are proposed to take effect in California starting January 2019 [91]. Existing work
on TOU tariffs either has not considered competitive retail markets or has used
more abstract, smaller-scale simulations compared with Power TAC [130, 127, 10,
14, 118, 1, 107, 131, 19]. In Power TAC, to the best of our knowledge the first
broker that used TOU tariffs was Mertacor13 [66] (see Section 8.5). Mertacor13
used TOU tariffs with 2 or 3 daily rates. However, at that time the Power TAC
simulator included only non-shifting customers, so that the impact of TOU tariffs in
presence of demand-shifting customers could not be tested. Other than Mertacor13,
Power TAC broker agents used fixed-rate tariffs [67, 31, 111, 63, 4, 56, 57].
Therefore, to the best of our knowledge, our research is the first to investigate
the usage of TOU tariffs by autonomous brokers in a large-scale, detailed, realistic
simulation of competitive retail power markets with autonomous, demand-shifting
customer agents.
The issue of free-riding customers was described in several references. Free-
riding customers are customers who benefit from reduced costs due to demand-
shifting of other customers without changing their own demand. According to Hol-
land et al. [30], such customers could attain up to 90% of the benefit of RTP (real-
time pricing) adoption by other customers. Other research analyzed the potential
savings of shifting customers and free-riders as a function of the percentage of shifted
quantity [98]. Some solutions that discourage free-riding were offered by Horowitz
et al. [32]. These solutions aim at rolling the savings due to demand-shifting more
fairly on customers, based on each customer’s contribution to peak-flattening. How-
ever, their proposed methods use hypothetical, non-shifted customer consumption
profiles as a basis for their computation. They offer to construct such profiles from
historical data, but this may be challenging to do over the long run, since hypo-
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thetical, non-shifted consumption patterns may change over time without being
observed (since only the actual, potentially shifted, consumption can be observed).
In Power TAC’s competitive retail market, free-riding can occur among fixed-rate
brokers who benefit from peak-reduction of non-fixed-rate brokers, and thus can
offer their customers attractive fixed-rate tariffs.
8.2 MAS for the Smart Grid
The need and the potential benefits of employing artificial intelligence (AI) for the
benefit of the smart grid have been laid out by Ramchurn et al. [84]. In this paper,
the authors have argued that the smart grid vision, as laid out by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Energy [114], not only presents challenges for power systems engineering,
telecommunications and cyber-security, but also embodies concepts that have long
been investigated in the computer science and AI communities, such as distributed
intelligence, automation and information exchange. The authors have argued that
the smart grid provides new challenges to be solved by the AI community. Therefore,
they have proposed the foundations of a new research agenda of using AI for solving
challenges of the smart grid. Some of these challenges require algorithms that solve
problems involving large number of heterogeneous, self-interested participants (such
as different types of consumers and generation facilities), under high-levels of uncer-
tainty and dynamism. The authors have highlighted how such issues appear in key
components of the future smart grid: demand-side management, electric vehicles,
virtual power plants, the emergence of prosumers (customers that both consume
and produce energy), and self-healing networks. Power TAC addresses many of
these challenges by providing a rich, multiagent simulation environment that in-
cludes prosumers (consumers and renewable producers), demand-side management
capabilities (both pricing based and direct load-control based), and electric vehicles.
Power TAC investigates economically motivated decisions of large number of actors,
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which are at the core of the challenges laid out by Ramchurn et al. [45].
In the recent years multiagent systems were proposed to address different
challenges in the smart grid. Some examples follow next. A multiagent system
was proposed for managing micro-grid operations [78]; this system facilitated seam-
less transition of the micro-grid from a grid-connected state into an isolated island
mode, upon detection of upstream outages. This type of research is complemen-
tary to Power TAC, since it models the distribution network in more detail then
Power TAC, but lacks Power TAC’s large-scale, detailed customer models.
Vytelingum et al. explored the theoretical and practical foundations of agent-
based micro storage implementation in the smart grid [123]. They developed a game-
theoretic framework to analyze strategic choices made by agents controlling micro-
storage in the smart grid, and devised a novel micro-storage strategy that allowed
an agent to maximize its owner’s savings. This dissertation focuses on a different
problem of designing a broker agent that acts effectively in a future smart grid
electricity markets in the presence of autonomous customer agents. However, this
research can complement Power TAC, since such storage-controlling agents could
be incorporated into the Power TAC simulator’s customer models.
Ramchurn et al. proposed an agent-based system for decentralized demand-
side management [83]. Their research focused on using agents for managing cus-
tomers’ demand. Therefore this research can be incorporated into Power TAC’s
customer models. Their experiments showed a herding phenomenon, which oc-
curred when many customer agents shifted their consumption to low-price times,
thus creating new peaks. This dissertation focuses on a related but different topic
of designing broker agents that operate in presence of autonomous customers, and
shows that autonomous utility-maximizing brokers can prevent herding, by implic-
itly coordinating customers’ consumption through Time-Of-Use (TOU) tariffs that
are designed to optimize the brokers’ profits.
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Agent-based systems were proposed for coordinating energy procurement by
a customer-cooperative [118]. This research focused on the customers’ perspective,
rather than on the retail brokers’ perspective which is the focus of this dissertation:
they assumed that a coordinator represented a consumer cooperative in procurement
of energy for minimal costs. This coordinator has not set energy prices or aimed to
incur profits by selling electricity, as our autonomous broker agent do.
Agent-based systems were proposed for automating energy savings in build-
ings [90, 109, 110, 58, 69]. Such research could be incorporated into Power TAC’s
customer models, by modeling different aspects of customer energy-savings behav-
iors in detail.
Recent publications related to Power TAC described novel customer agent
models such as electric vehicles that optimized charging based on prices [116], electric
vehicle based Virtual Power Plants (VPP) [36, 37], and negotiated learning for
autonomous customer agents [88]. Such models are being gradually incorporated
into Power TAC.
Other research investigated the use mechanisms and trading strategies for
the smart grid and modeled smart grid operations [120, 119]. Related research in-
vestigated autonomous trading brokers [85, 86, 77] (described in more detail in sec-
tion 8.5). While the results of this research were promising, as was pointed out, this
research was limited in two important ways [45]: (a) limited scope, and/or (b) lim-
ited competitiveness and comparability. In contrast, a major benefit of Power TAC
is that it is an open platform that is available as a test bed and a benchmark for
any research group.
8.3 Agent-Based Power Market Simulations
The complexity of electricity markets calls for rich modeling techniques that can help
to understand and analyze their dynamics. Traditional modeling methods are usu-
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ally not able to capture the complex dynamics of electricity markets. Agent-Based
Computational Economics (ACE) [106] is a computational study of economies mod-
eled as evolving systems of autonomous interacting agents. ACE can offer methods
for realistic electricity market modeling. Indeed, different electricity market simula-
tions has been developed using the ACE paradigm (e.g. AMES [62], NEMSIM [28],
EMCAS [13], MASCEM [81], and others), many of which focus on wholesale market
modeling. Surveys of these simulations and many others were done by Weidlich et
al. and Zhou et al. [125, 132].
Power TAC extends the ACE paradigm by creating a rich retail power market
simulation and inviting research teams to develop agents that act as retail brokers
in the simulation and enter them to an annual competition. Power TAC is therefore
a flexible, competitive platform that is easy to use for research and benchmarking
purposes by teams from different research groups.
8.4 Autonomous Trading Agents and TAC
Autonomous trading agents has been an active research area in the AI community,
and there is an immense body of literature in this area. Therefore, we will focus on
approaches that are directly related to LATTE, and refer the reader to surveys of
approaches that are less directly related.
To the best of our knowledge, the earliest research on autonomous trading
agents introduced shopbots, which collect information about price and quality of
goods, and pricebots, which automate the price-setting process for sellers [27, 25,
43, 26, 42].
Power TAC is a specific instance of a Trading Agent Competition (TAC)1.
Trading agent competitions were held annually since 2000. Trading agent competi-
tions other than Power TAC were in domains such as autonomous bidding for multi-
1http://tac.sics.se
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ple interacting goods [126], autonomous supply-chain management (TAC-SCM) [94],
ad-auctions (TAC-AA) [33], and ad exchange (TAC-Adx) [104].
LATTE is a lookahead policy that optimizes the predicted utility of action
combinations. Utility-optimization approaches were used in prior trading agent com-
petitions, however the game setups and the problems they solved, and consequently
the methods used, were different than LATTE. For example, decision-theoretic
bidding using Monte-Carlo estimation of the clearing price distribution was used
for one-sided auctions [102, 101]. A predictive-planning approach in the supply-
chain management was introduced by Pardoe et al. [72, 73], in which planning and
scheduling were executed based on estimations of future resource availability and
constraints. Such an approach can be viewed as a lookahead policy over the underly-
ing domain’s MDP (such as LATTE), although it was not described in that way. This
approach executed interdependent optimization, optimizing supply inventories and
procurement given demand predictions, and optimizing production and sales, given
predictions of supply inventories and future deliveries. The TAC-SCM domain has
some similarities to Power TAC: in both competitions autonomous trading agents
compete for maximizing profit by buying goods from suppliers and selling them
to consumers. However, the trading mechanisms used in TAC-SCM were request
for quotes, in market structures different then the electricity market structures in
Power TAC. Consequently, the specific problems solved and the methods used were
different that LATTE.
In TAC-AA, another utility optimization approach was used [71]: the agent
operated by estimating the full game state from limited information using methods
such as particle filter [75], used these estimates to make predictions, and optimized
its actions (daily bids, ads, and spending limits) with respect to these predictions.
Descriptions of these methods can be found in Pardoe’s Ph.D. dissertation [76], or
in a shorter version [74].
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Some other competitors in trading agent competitions used methods other
than utility-optimization. A survey of 22 agent strategies used in the first trading
agent competition (in 2000) is provided by Stone et al. [100], and a survey of strate-
gies from the 2002 trading agent competition is provided by Greenwald et al. [24].
Examples of other proposed approaches to agent design included a game theoretic
analysis of the economy [48] and fuzzy reasoning [29].
8.5 Power TAC Broker Agents
The research that is most directly related to ours is that of other Power TAC broker
developers. Our work differs from this research along two dimensions: problem-
formulation, and broker-strategy. This section summarizes the differences along
each of these dimensions as applicable, first in general and then in more detail.
Along the problem formulation dimension, this dissertation is the first to
formalize the complete MDP defined by the underlying broker electricity trading
problem. Previous research either did not formulate the trading problem explicitly,
or used an MDP to model either a more abstract trading problem [85, 86], or a
subproblem of the complete trading problem [77, 57, 111, 56, 4, 67]. Moreover, all
these MDP models were heuristically and manually constructed. In contrast, our
MDP is defined by the underlying problem. Along the broker-strategy dimension,
related research either did not explicitly optimize the actions’ predicted utility, or
used tariff optimization strategies that can be viewed as special cases of LATTE and
which were developed in parallel to LATTE. A detailed comparison follows next.
8.5.1 Early Power TAC Brokers
To the best of our knowledge, the first work that developed strategies for autonomous
electricity-trading retail broker agents was that of [86] and its subsequent [85]. This
work modeled a more abstract broker trading problem, which did not include whole-
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sale trading, and assumed fixed customer consumption instead of the variable daily
load profile of Power TAC customers. Their broker approximated this abstract
trading problem as an MDP using manually-constructed state features on top of a
state-space discretization, and using a fixed set of 6 manually defined pricing tactics
that were used as MDP actions. This broker used a Q-learning [124] based strategy
on top of this approximate MDP model. Therefore, along the problem formulation
dimension, the work in [86, 85] modeled a more abstract trading problem than ours,
and used a manually constructed, heuristic MDP model instead of the complete
MDP of the underlying domain that we use. Along the broker strategy dimension,
similarly to our work, this work optimized the predicted expected utility; however
it did so over approximate, manually constructed models rather than over the com-
plete, underlying MDP. Their smaller, approximate MDP model allowed for using
Q-learning, while in our complete MDP model Q-learning would be computationally
intractable.
SELF [77] was a broker strategy developed in an early, simplified simulation
environment (compared with Power TAC), in which (a) a small number of 50 cus-
tomers was used, (b) daily wholesale markets where randomly sampled from past
price-data, so that a broker did not impact wholesale prices, (c) any wholesale order
of broker was fulfilled, (d) imbalance fee was a fixed-price per-unit (rather than a
function of all brokers’ imbalances). SELF modeled the tariff selection problem as
an MDP using manually constructed state features and a set of 6 pre-defined tariff
actions, and used the SARSA RL algorithm [92] with function approximation and
feature-selection/regularization to select tariff market actions. Therefore, along the
problem formulation dimension, SELF used an MDP to model the tariff strategy
subproblem of a more abstract trading problem, using manually constructed, heuris-
tic state and action spaces. Along the broker strategy dimension, similarly to our
work, SELF optimized the predicted expected utility; however it did so over ap-
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proximate, manually constructed models rather than over the complete, underlying
MDP. Their smaller, approximate MDP model allowed for using SARSA, while in
our complete MDP model SARSA would be computationally intractable.
8.5.2 Power TAC 2013 agents
CwiBroker13 [63] (2nd place, 2013) used two different tariff strategies. For duopoly
markets, it used a tariff strategy inspired by Tit-for-Tat. For oligopoly markets
it used a tariff strategy that generated candidate fixed-rate tariffs and estimated
their future profits. The idea of estimating tariff profits has similarities to LATTE’s
utility-optimization, although it seems to have been implemented differently. They
report that this oligopoly strategy did not work well, and that a fallback heuristic
strategy was responsible for improving its performance in the oligopoly setup. Later
versions of CwiBroker (see below) abandoned this profit-estimation based oligopoly
strategy and moved to a new heuristic-based strategy. CwiBroker13’s wholesale
strategy introduced the idea of multiple bids among Power TAC brokers, but was
based on equilibria in continuous auctions, rather than TacTex-15’s hedging between
optimistic strategic bidding and truthful bidding. Therefore, along the problem for-
mulation dimension, we are not aware of any MDP models used by CwiBroker13.
Along the broker strategy dimension, CwiBroker13’s Tit-for-Tat strategy is differ-
ent than our utility-estimation based strategy; CwiBroker13’s oligopoly strategy
has similarities with our utility-based strategy, but was implemented differently;
CwiBroker13’s equilibrium-based wholesale bidding strategy was different than our
MDP-based wholesale bidding.
CrocodileAgent13 [4] (4th place, 2013) used a variant Roth-Erev reinforce-
ment learning algorithm to coordinate wholesale bidding across different markets by
choosing among one of four pre-implemented wholesale strategies. Therefore, along
the problem formulation dimension, CrocodileAgent13 used an MDP to model a
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subproblem of the complete trading problem, using manually constructed, heuristic
state and action spaces.
The 2013 AstonTAC agent [57, 56] (5th place, 2013) used an MDP to model
the wholesale bidding process and a separate SMDP [103] to model the tariff se-
lection process. In its bidding MDP, AstonTAC assumed an underlying discrete
model for wholesale clearing prices (HMM), where 20 possible states were built of-
fline from a game’s bootstrap data. It used a discrete set of manually constructed
reward values to represent wholesale bidding performance. In its tariff selection
SMDP, AstonTAC used manually selected sets of finite states and actions. There-
fore, along the problem formulation dimension, AstonTAC used an MDP and an
SMDP to model subproblems of the complete trading problem, using discrete, man-
ually constructed, heuristic state and action spaces. In addition, AstonTAC’s MDP
differs from our bidding MDP (Chapter 5), in that (i) our bidding MDP does not
assume an underlying model of the market, but rather uses a more flexible, non-
parametric model of clearing prices at every state, (ii) our reward is determined by
actual prices rather than by a manually constructed set of reward signals. Along
the broker-strategy dimension, similarly to our work, AstonTAC optimized the pre-
dicted expected utility; however it did so over approximate, manually constructed
models rather than over the complete, underlying MDP.
Mertacor13 [66] used two types of tariff strategies: (i) a tariff formulation
strategy, and (ii) a tariff update strategy. Both strategies were treated as optimiza-
tion problems, where the broker’s objectives were both maximizing its profit and
maintaining an acceptable customer market share. Mertacor13’s general approach
was to create a set of 4-6 dimensional particles, each representing a tariff, and use the
predicted broker profit as an objective and a Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO)
algorithm to search for a tariff with a highest predicted profit. Mertacor13’s market
share affected the particle search space boundaries. The 4-6 particle parameters
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represented (i) a signup fee, (ii) a periodic fee, (iii) an early withdraw penalty, and
(iv) either one fixed-rate price, or three Time-Of-Use rates specifying different prices
for three periods that together cover a 24-hour period. Along the problem formu-
lation dimension, Mertacor13 did not explicitly define an MDP model. Along the
broker-strategy dimension, similarly to our approach, Mertacor13’s strategy aimed
at optimizing the predicted tariff profits. In contrast to our approach, Mertacor13
(1) generated candidates using the Particle Swarm Optimization algorithm, and (2)
did not seem to incorporate into its utility predictions the effect of publishing a
tariff on the profits of its existing tariffs.
To the best of our knowledge, Mertacor13 was that first broker that used
Time-Of-Use tariffs. In contrast to LATTE-TOU which uses 24 hourly rates and a
gradient-ascent optimization algorithm, Mertacor13 used three rates and a PSO op-
timization algorithm. Mertacor13’s Time-Of-Use tariffs’ performance was reported
to be slightly lower than its fixed-rate tariffs’ performance. We hypothesize that
this lower performance was due to the fact that customers did not have shifting ca-
pabilities at that time, and therefore viewed a Time-Of-Use tariff as having higher
discomfort (based on a fixed discomfort factor that was implemented in this earlier
version of the Power TAC simulator) without reducing their costs.
8.5.3 Power TAC 2014 agents
AgentUDE14 [67] (1st place, 2014) used an empirically tuned, heuristic tariff strat-
egy that bound customers with early withdraw penalties and provoked competitors
to reduce prices, so that customers would withdraw and pay withdraw-penalties. In
the wholesale market AgentUDE14 used Q-learning. Therefore, along the problem
formulation dimension, AgentUDE14 used an MDP to model a subproblem of the
complete trading problem. Along the broker-strategy dimension, AgentUDE14’s
empirically-tuned heuristic strategy differs from our utility-optimization approach.
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CwiBroker14 (2nd place, 2014) [31] used tuned heuristics based on domain
knowledge: in the wholesale market, it adapted its bids towards bids that would have
been cleared in recent auctions, and in the tariff market it reduced prices in a pace
that is inversely proportional to its market share. Along the problem formulation
dimension, to the best of our knowledge CwiBroker14 did not use an MDP model.
Along the broker strategy dimension, CwiBroker14’s strategy differs from our utility-
optimization approach in that it did not explicitly optimized a utility measure. A
detailed analysis of the 2014 Power TAC finals can be found at Babic et al. [5].
8.5.4 Power TAC 2015
In our experiments, we have used broker agent binaries that were released after the
2015 Power TAC finals. However, at the time of this writing, we are not aware of
any publications describing these 2015 agents: the most recent publications that we
know of describe the 2014 agents.
8.6 Chapter Summary
This section provided an overview of related work in the areas of smart grid and
electricity markets, multiagent systems for the smart grid, agent-based electric-
ity market simulations, autonomous trading agents inside and outside the Trading
Agent Competitions (TAC), and Power TAC. Based on this literature review, this
dissertation makes several contributions to the state-of-the-art.
Smart grid electricity markets were studied inside and outside the context of
multiagent systems. However, past research has not investigated the dynamics of
future retail electricity markets in a large-scale, realistic, detailed simulation such
as Power TAC, specifically in presence of real-time smart-metering and autonomous
agents acting on behalf of customers and retailers.
Using Power TAC as a substrate domain, this dissertation is the first to for-
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malize the complete autonomous electricity trading problem faced by a broker agent
in future electricity markets. This dissertation then introduces LATTE. LATTE is
a lookahead-policy that optimizes the broker’s predicted utility and approximates
the solution of the autonomous electricity trading problem. Previous research in
other trading agent competitions (TAC) used utility-optimization approaches, how-
ever the domains, and consequently the methods used were different than LATTE.
Other approaches to Power TAC broker design either did not explicitly optimize
the actions’ predicted utility, or used tariff optimization strategies that could be
viewed as restricted cases of LATTE. The TacTex agents, which achieved state-of-
the-art performance in international competitions and controlled experiments, are a
unique contribution of this dissertation. The empirical analysis of the importance of
different components of broker agents using LATTE is another unique contribution
of this dissertation. Finally, this dissertation is the first to investigate the impact
of Time-Of-Use (TOU) tariffs used by autonomous brokers in competitive markets
with autonomous customer agents, in a detailed, large-scale, realistic retail-market
simulation such as Power TAC.
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Chapter 9
Conclusions and Future Work
Motivated by the Power TAC domain, and by the potential contribution of au-
tonomous retail broker agents to future smart grids, this dissertation contributes a
general algorithm for autonomous trading in modern electricity markets and ana-
lyzes its impact on autonomous brokers and on the economy. This chapter reviews
the dissertation’s scientific contributions to the areas of artificial intelligence, smart
grids, and electricity markets (Section 9.1), and then discusses promising directions
for future work in the challenging domain of autonomous electricity trading (Sec-
tion 9.2).
9.1 Contributions
The five main contributions of this dissertation are summarized as follows.
1. The problem formalization of autonomous retail broker trading in modern
electricity markets presented in Chapter 3 is suitable when (a) a broker trades
in the retail market by publishing tariff contracts, (b) a broker trades in the
wholesale market by bidding for future contracts in a sequence of auctions,
and (c) electricity supply-demand imbalance results in payments to or by the
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broker. This problem is a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process,
however for computational tractability and modeling clarity, we formalize it
as a Markov Decision Process, which due to its complexity is intractable to
solve exactly. Therefore, this problem formalization provides a guideline for
approximate solutions to the trading problem.
2. LATTE (Chapter 4) is a general algorithm for real-time autonomous trading
in modern electricity markets. LATTE, (Lookahead-policy for Autonomous
Time-constrained Trading of Electricity) approximates the solution to the au-
tonomous broker trading problem using a lookahead policy that efficiently
samples action combinations and predicts their expected utility over a future
horizon. LATTE interleaves action sampling with action-effect predictions to
constrain the number of action-combinations that it examines. LATTE is a
general framework that can be instantiated in different ways that tailor it to
specific setups.
3. The TacTex agents are fully implemented and operational agents that per-
formed successfully at international tournaments and controlled experiments.
This dissertation contributes their binaries, as well as their source code and
other related resources (see Appendix A). The TacTex agents use different
instantiations of LATTE (Chapters 5, 6, 7) and can serve as benchmarks for
future research in the power trading domain.
4. Extensive empirical analysis (Chapters 5, 6, 7) validates the effectiveness
and robustness of the instantiations of LATTE to different competition levels
and under a variety of environmental conditions, shedding light on the main
reasons for LATTE’s success by examining the importance of its constituent
components.
5. The impact of Time-Of-Use tariffs in competitive markets on an au-
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tonomous broker and on the economy was analyzed empirically. Time-Of-Use
tariffs are a main method proposed for demand-side management both in the
literature and in real-markets. One of the instantiations of LATTE contributes
a principled, gradient-ascent algorithm for optimizing Time-Of-Use tariffs by
an autonomous broker in competitive markets.
Empirical analysis shows that a self-interested broker can use Time-Of-Use
tariffs to benefit itself, and by doing so it benefits its customers and the econ-
omy. While Time-Of-Use tariffs can induce customer-herding, our Time-Of-
Use broker prevented it by implicitly coordinating flattening through profit-
maximizing tariffs. This coordinated flattening underlines a potential benefit
of employing autonomous Time-Of-Use brokers in competitive power markets.
In addition, we have seen that a Time-Of-Use broker’s customer share is an
important factor in its ability to flatten demand: to counter-balance peaked
consumption of fixed-rate brokers’ customers, it needs to gain large customer-
share by creating attractive Time-Of-Use tariffs that are still profitable.
9.2 Future Work
While the TacTex agents performed successfully in competitions and controlled ex-
periments using LATTE, there are still many important challenges to be addressed
in the autonomous electricity trading domain. This chapter surveys promising di-
rections for future work of extending LATTE within Power TAC (Section 9.2.1), of
extending Power TAC to encourage productive future work on real-world problems,
(Section 9.2.2), and of extending LATTE towards working in real-world markets
(Section 9.2.3).
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9.2.1 Directions for Extending LATTE within Power TAC
This section surveys promising directions for extending LATTE within the Power TAC
domain.
Using production tariffs for renewable energy: production tariffs are contracts
for procuring energy from renewable producers, and as such they are the main
tool for acquiring clean energy resources. While our instantiations of LATTE
have not sampled production tariff actions, LATTE includes the framework to
use them. The only change that needs to be made is to sample production
tariff actions is a new instantiation of the ComputeNextCandidateTariffAction()
function. Our initial instantiation of LATTE with production tariffs shows
promising results. This instantiation executes at any given timeslot either
lookahead trajectories with consumption tariff actions, or lookahead trajecto-
ries with production tariff actions, interleaving between the two across different
timeslots. In this way, the observed effect of one type of tariff action is taken
into account in the lookahead with the other type of tariff action, forming an
incremental local optimization procedure.
Optimizing supply-demand imbalance: While in general a broker should aim
to perfectly balance the supply and demand in its portfolio, in some situations
a broker can benefit from having an imbalanced portfolio, for instance when
such an imbalance contributes to lower the total imbalance of all brokers.
Referring back to the Reward() function in LATTE (lines 32-34), the bal(IB0,t)
term which determines the imbalance payments can be positive in such cases.
By sampling non-zero imbalance levels in the SampleImbalanceLevels() function
(line 9 of LATTE), and by learning the bal(IB0,t) function online, a broker
could predict the compensation for different imbalance levels and use them in
its lookahead inside the Reward() function.
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Direct Load Control (DLC): Direct load control is a demand-side management
method that presents an alternative to pricing-based demand-side manage-
ment. In Power TAC direct load control can be achieved by balancing-market
actions that curtail consumption and control storage devices. Extending LATTE
to use such actions would equip it with an important class of demand-side
management actions. To use such actions, LATTE will have to examine com-
binations of wholesale-, tariff- and balancing-market actions in its lookahead,
which may increase its lookahead complexity by an order of magnitude. Find-
ing an efficient way to incorporate such actions into LATTE’s lookahead is an
important research direction. An initial implementation could treat balancing
actions hierarchically (similarly to how LATTE treats wholesale actions), sam-
ple imbalance levels to aim for (see previous item), and then examine combi-
nations of wholesale-procurement and curtailment quantities that achieve the
desired imbalance. The curtailment orders’ limit prices could be optimized at
a lower level similarly to LATTE’s wholesale bidding algorithm.
Real-Time Pricing (RTP) tariffs: Real-Time Pricing (RTP) tariffs have been
proposed as a pricing-based demand-side management method. While LATTE
could be extended to sample such tariffs in its lookahead, the decision-making
process of setting these prices in real-time is outside the scope of LATTE, and
would required extending LATTE’s framework. A possible first step in this
direction could be parameterizing and sampling RTP tariffs by their expected
prices in ComputeNextCandidateTariffAction(), then publishing a tariff based
on LATTE’s lookahead, and then setting real-time prices using a lookahead
thread that executes between tariff publications. This lookahead thread will
need to select a real-time price at each timeslot, and each such selection will
affect customers’ consumption in the following timeslots. Even with price
discretization, the lookahead search will increase combinatorially. To keep
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the complexity of search within practical bounds, Monte-Carlo Tree-Search
methods such as UCT [50] may turn out useful.
Time-Of-Use (TOU) free riders: Time-Of-Use tariffs can create a free-rider phe-
nomenon, in which brokers who use fixed-rate tariffs and do not contribute
to peak-flattening, enjoy the reduced prices caused by Time-Of-Use brokers.
An interesting direction for future research is the question of how to incen-
tivize brokers more fairly, such that brokers’ contribution to peak-flattening
would affect their compensation. A first step in this direction is quantifying
the monetary impact of a broker’s contribution to peak-flattening and use it
to derive a broker’s compensation for its contribution.
Theoretical analysis of Time-Of-Use (TOU) tariffs: This dissertation has an-
alyzed Time-Of-Use tariffs empirically. An important and interesting direction
for future research is to augment the empirical results with a theoretical anal-
ysis of the properties and impact of Time-Of-Use tariffs used by autonomous
brokers in competitive retail markets. Such an analysis could characterize
when TOU tariffs would be beneficial for the broker and for the economy,
characterize how a broker’s market-share affect TOU tariffs’ benefit for the
broker and for the economy, and provide theoretical guarantees on the quality
of approximate solutions such as LATTE-TOU’s.
Time-Of-Use tariffs in presence of renewable generation: We investigated the
usage of Time-Of-Use tariffs by brokers to reduce the peak-demand. An im-
portant potential use for Time-Of-Use tariffs is adapting demand to match
the availability of intermittent, renewable resources such as solar and wind.
LATTE-TOU has all the required components in place; in our code, all that is
needed is to turn on the flag that enables production tariff publications, and
investigate LATTE-TOU’s behavior in presence of these production tariffs.
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Time-Of-Use tariffs in presence of many competing brokers: Investigating
the impact of Time-Of-Use tariffs on brokers and on the economy in the pres-
ence of highly competitive markets is an important direction for future re-
search. Electricity markets are gradually being opened to competition, and
Time-Of-Use pricing is one of the main methods proposed for demand-side
management. Therefore, the combination of Time-Of-Use tariffs and a highly
competitive market scenario that could be of interest to power market design-
ers. An interesting first step in this direction would be running different mixes
of TacTex-TOU with FixedRate brokers (see Chapter 7), at different compe-
tition levels, e.g. 4-, 6-, 8-broker games. For example, in 4-agent games, it
would be interesting to test 4 brokers of the same type, then 3 brokers of one
type and 1 broker of the other type, and 2 brokers of each type. It would be
interesting to examine whether increased competition solves the problem of
free-riders, and whether there are stronger or weaker financial incentives for
brokers to use TOU tariffs.
Contract hedging: In Power TAC, a broker can hedge itself in the tariff market by
using early withdraw penalties and periodic fees. Although not covered in this
dissertation, one of our brokers1 uses a version of LATTE that samples fixed-
rate tariffs with fixed early-withdraw fees. A more general implementation
would optimize the early-withdraw fees based on risk considerations.
Bayesian estimation of hidden information: LATTE uses heuristics and expected
values to estimate hidden information, such as the number of subscriptions to
competing tariffs. Pardoe et al. used a particle filter for estimating hidden
information [75] in the TAC Ad Auctions competition. Such an approach
may turn out to be useful for achieving better transition function predictions,
i.e. predicting customer responses, future demand, and auction results.
1TacTex-14 which was not covered in this dissertation, see Chapter 6.
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9.2.2 Directions for Extending Power TAC
This section surveys promising directions for extending Power TAC to encourage
productive future work on real-world problems.
Tightening the development feedback loop - faster simulations: To accel-
erate development progress in Power TAC it would be useful to tighten the
development feedback loop, at different levels. At the simulation level, it would
be useful to shorten the simulation time from the current time of 2 hours. Hav-
ing shorter simulations would allow for running more experiments and getting
insights more quickly. Shortening the simulation time is a challenging task:
out of the 5 seconds allocated per timeslot, the simulator typically uses less
then 2 seconds, leaving brokers 3 seconds for computation. To shorten the
time allocated per timeslot, the simulator, and potentially brokers, will have
to cut computation time significantly. This cut would require either profiling
the code and finding opportunities for increased efficiency, or abstracting pro-
cesses. The former is more desirable, but it is unclear if there is significant
room for improvement.
Tightening the development feedback loop - frequent benchmarking: The
Power TAC competition is an effective way to encourage research progress.
Typically, progress is fastest around competition time, due to the opportu-
nities to test broker agents against the most recent versions of competitors
(rather than against previous year’s competitors). To accelerate progress, we
suggest a setup in which all teams get to test their agent against the most
recent, state-of-the-art brokers that would be available to play against. Such
a setup could be a continual web-based tournament where everyone can up-
load binaries and test them against others at any time. Such a setup would
accelerate research, development, and could take even better advantage of the
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Power TAC simulation.
Increased realism - customer rationality: Power TAC customers are modeled
as being imperfectly rational, and as having inertia that makes them reluc-
tant to switch tariffs too frequently. These two properties model the effects
of imperfect information, and human decision making. It is reasonable to
believe that as autonomous customer agents become more widespread, infor-
mation flow will improve, autonomous customer agents will be able to make
more rational decisions, and they will not be inhibited by inertia. Power TAC
supports different customer rationality and inertia levels, which are easily con-
figurable. It would be interesting to test the dynamics of markets in presence
of more or less rational customers.
Past research in this domain included the work of [66], and some preliminary
research that we have done. In our experiments, we observed that with full
rationality and no inertia there are large fluctuations in customer subscrip-
tions, since customers always subscribe to the best tariff as soon as it was
published. Such phenomena could affect the stability of the electricity grid;
there is interesting research to be done in investigating methods to mitigate
this effect.
Increased realism - cost-comfort trade-off: In Power TAC, customer discom-
fort is an L2 norm of the difference between their desired consumption and
the actual consumption. In the real-world the discomfort model is more com-
plex, incorporating different hard constraints. Incorporating more complex
discomfort functions into Power TAC and into LATTE’s models will open an
interesting research direction, which will test the generality of LATTE across
different discomfort functions, and prepare it to operate in the real-world.
Increased realism - strong incentives to balance supply and demand: Strengthening
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the financial incentives to balance supply and demand in the simulator would
encourage brokers to use balancing actions more frequently, and come up with
new balancing strategies. Supply-demand balance is an important issue in the
real-world, and becomes more challenging with renewable, intermittent gen-
eration. Therefore, developing balancing strategies could have a significant
real-world impact.
Increased realism - running experiments in equilibrium mode: Broker prof-
its are bounded by the default tariffs proposed to customers by the simulator.
Currently, these default tariffs provide room for brokers to cooperate and sell
high above their marginal costs. Such cooperation has happened mainly in low
competition levels, such as 2-broker games, and is an artifact of Power TAC
simulating market liberalization at each game. In the real-world, the more
common situation is that prices settle around some equilibrium starting some
point in time. We believe that testing games with prices around price equilib-
riums (by narrowing the margin of the default simulation tariffs) can provide
interesting, useful insights on real-world dynamics.
Increased realism - line capacity limitation: With larger populations of dis-
tributed generation and distributed storage customers, line capacity limita-
tions may come into effect. Modeling line capacity limitations in Power TAC
is a challenging task, but could contribute to further advance the simulated
dynamics towards the real-world dynamics.
Increased realism - power factor effects: A customer’s power factor affects en-
ergy losses, and could therefore affect brokers’ decisions on how to charge cus-
tomers with high energy losses. Adding power factor effects into Power TAC
will increase the realism of the retail market dynamics.
Increased realism - simulation time resolution: Power TAC’s simulation time
134
progresses in discrete, 1-hour steps. While this allows to model period of
months, it limits the resolution in which electrical and market events can be
simulated. Increasing the resolution of the simulation is a challenging task,
however if it were to be done, it would further advance the simulator towards
real-world dynamics.
9.2.3 Directions for Extending LATTE to Real Markets
An important goal for future research is extending LATTE to being usable in real-
world markets. The previous two sections laid out two groups of future directions,
one for extending LATTE within Power TAC (Section 9.2.1), and the other for fur-
ther increasing the realism of Power TAC (Section 9.2.2). Both groups of future
directions should get LATTE closer to being operational in real-markets, by encour-
aging extended and refined instantiations of LATTE. This section lists steps that we
view as important milestones for deploying LATTE in real-world markets:
Real-time smart-meter readings: The Power TAC simulator assumes that all
customers have smart-meters that report their readings to the broker once
per hour, in real-time. In many real-world regions, smart-meters are not in-
stalled yet. Moreover, in many of the regions where smart-meters are installed,
readings are not sent in real-time to the retailer, but rather with some delay,
e.g. once per day and delayed by 48 hours. The ability of a broker to ob-
serve customer readings in real-time is important for acting and responding in
real-time. While LATTE could still work with delayed readings, it would work
more accurately with real-time readings.
Autonomous customer agents: In Power TAC, autonomous agents optimize cus-
tomers’ cost and comfort by subscribing to tariffs and adapting customers’
consumption. These autonomous agents are more efficient and reactive than
human customers. To get the most benefit out of LATTE, it would be useful to
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use it in retail markets where such autonomous customer agents are installed.
Therefore, deploying autonomous customer agents in buildings can facilitate
the testing of LATTE in the real-world. LATTE does not inherently depend on
the existence of such agents, however their increased responsiveness will give
LATTE a larger space of actions to optimize over.
Small field tests: Following up on the previous item, an important step towards
deploying LATTE in the real-world would be to test it in small field tests, with
tens, then hundreds of homes that employ autonomous customer agents. Since
the resulting environment would include tens or hundreds of agents, such tests
may be able to reveal potential destructive combinations of agent behaviors,
and refine/constrain both LATTE and the autonomous customers behaviors.
Worst-case behavior: While in Power TAC the goal of a broker is to maximize
its expected profit, in the real-world customer agreement to participate in
automated markets would probably also depend on their level of exposure to
worst-case events. Therefore, an important direction for future research is
extending LATTE to incorporate worst-case and risk considerations.
Learning predictors from data: Our empirical analysis revealed the importance
of having accurate demand-predictions to LATTE’s performance. In the real-
world, customer subscription behavior, consumption elasticity, and consump-
tion shifting may have complex functional patterns. These behaviors will have
to be learned effectively from real-world data. Similarly, cost-predictions will
have to be learned from real-world data. Learning predictors from real-world
data will likely require new instantiations of LATTE, with new implementa-
tions of the PredictTariffEffects() (line 7 of LATTE) and PredictWholesalePrice()
(line 16 of LATTE) functions.
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9.3 Concluding Remarks
This dissertation lays a foundation for understanding how autonomous electricity
trading broker agents should operate in real-time modern electricity markets, by
contributing a general decision-making framework for such brokers. Based on this
foundation, effective and robust autonomous brokers can be designed. Such brokers
could be used as a basis for research on how to design electricity markets that would
utilize such brokers most effectively to the benefit of clean, reliable, and sustainable
energy. I believe that AI will increasingly be used for the benefit of the smart grid,
and I hope that this dissertation will contribute to a better understanding of how
to build intelligent agents that will take part in addressing the complex challenges
faced by future energy delivery systems.
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Appendix A
TacTex Agents Source Code,
Binaries, and Resources
The source code and binaries of the TacTex agents, as well as related resources are
an online appendix. The online appendix additionally includes links to official sim-
ulator versions, as well as source code of specific versions used for experimentation




Power TAC Game Parameters
Table B.1: Parameters used in Power TAC tournament games. Source: The
Power TAC game specification [46].
Parameter Standard Game Setting
Length of pre-game bootstrap period 14 days
Nominal length of game 60 days
Probability of game end for each time slot after time slot
1320 (start of day 55)
1
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Minimum game length 1320
Expected game length 1440
Timeslot length 60 minutes
Time compression ratio 720 (5 seconds/time slot)
Open time slots on wholesale market 24
Market closing time 1 time slot ahead
Minimum order quantity 0.1 kWh
Distribution fee [0.003 - 0.03]e/kWh
Balancing price basis most recent clearing price
Balancing cost [0.02 - 0.06]e/kWh
Slope of regulating market price 10−6, 10−6 e/kWh
Default broker’s min and max bid order prices -100, -5
Default broker’s min and max ask order prices 0.1, 30
Tariff publication fee [1000 - 5000] e
Tariff revocation fee [100 - 500] e
Tariff publication interval 6 time slots
Daily bank debt interest rate 4.0%/365 · · · 12.0%/365
Daily bank deposit interest rate 0.5β
Weather report interval 1 hour
Weather forecast interval 1 hour
Weather forecast horizon 24 hours
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